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No More Old Boys’ Club:
Institutional Investors’ Fiduciary
Duty to Advance Board Gender
Diversity
Anat Alon-Beck†* Michal Agmon-Gonnen** & Darren Rosenblum***
As the benefits of gender equality for governance become more apparent,
boardroom diversity initiatives abound. At the same time, institutional
investors play an increasingly central role in the corporate world. This
Article takes a novel approach to achieve this necessary change.
Institutional investors already oversee firm leadership quite closely. This
Article suggests that institutional investors hold a fiduciary duty to ensure
there is gender diversity in leadership. As objections to state mandates
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persist, institutional investors can bring the benefits of private ordering to
play a central role in ensuring equality.
Institutional investors play a dominant role over firms as principal
shareholders. With that power comes responsibility. As stewards to their
beneficiaries and the companies in which they invest, institutional investors
could have a fiduciary duty to observe and encourage equality for women
in the boardroom. Such investors, by virtue of their influence, can foster a
marked improvement in gender equality. This Article analyzes the role
fiduciary duties play for institutional investors and how diversification
should figure as central among them.
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INTRODUCTION
I’m sometimes asked when will there be enough [women on the
Supreme Court] and I say, ‘When there are nine,’ people are
shocked. But there’d been nine men, and nobody’s ever raised a
question about that.
—Ruth Bader Ginsburg1
Despite recent improvements, corporate leadership continues to be a
man’s world. As of 2019, men constituted 80% of board members and
96% of CEOs.2 Parity in corporate leadership remains a distant dream.
1 Gloria Feldt, “Where There Are Nine” and Other Powerful Quotes About Gender
Equality from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, GLORIAFELDT (Sept. 28, 2020),
https://gloriafeldt.com/2020/09/28/when-there-are-nine-and-other-powerful-quotesabout-gender-equality-from-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg/ [https://perma.cc/GR7J-JDZG].
2 This Article focuses on women, but people of all sexes, apart from cisgender men,
face these same exclusions. For information on this male dominance, see infra Sections
A–B. See also DELOITTE GLOB. CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM:
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 8-9 (6th ed. 2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-risk-women-in-the-boardroom-sixth-edition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76QB-LNJJ].
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The past twenty years have brought a sea of change, as most of the
world’s top ten economies have embraced some regulation to advance
boardroom gender equality.3 California adopted legislation not only for
women, but also for other “underrepresented groups.” Dominant critics
in the United States question whether the State should force companies
to implement gender diversity on boards.4
Amid escalating battles over diversity, activist shareholders are
demanding change. Shareholder derivative lawsuits recently began
targeting major public and private companies.5 They allege that their
board of directors breached their fiduciary duties as a result of an “old
boys’ club” corporate culture.6 Despite making public commitments to
diversity, the pursuit of equality, and inclusion, boards often fall short
of welcoming diverse directors, especially women.7 These lawsuits mark
a shift to a focus on corporate culture.8 Some of them unequivocally
focus on the board’s lack of focus on diversity.9
3

See infra Parts II.B.1–5.
See infra Parts I.C–D.
5 See Samantha Burdick, Bianca DiBella, Pamela Palmer, Alexandra Peurach &
Howard Privette, A New Wave of Board Diversity Derivative Litigation, JDSUPRA (Oct.
21, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-new-wave-of-board-diversity-89301/
[https://perma.cc/7LDB-QLDJ]. See generally Verified Shareholder Derivative
Complaint at 5, Klein v. Ellison, No. 20-cv-04439 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2020) (filing suit
against Oracle for its lack of diversity); Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at
3, Ocegueda v. Zuckerberg, No. 20-cv-04444 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2020) (filing suit against
Facebook for its lack of diversity); Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 2, Falat
v. Sacks, No. 8:20-cv-01782 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020) (filing suit against Monster
Beverage Corporation for its lack of diversity).
6 Burdick et al., supra note 5; Jessie K. Liu, Susan L. Saltzstein & Tansy Woan,
Shareholder Suits Demand More Progress on Diversity, SKADDEN (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/04/the-informed-board/shareholdersuits-demand-more-progress [https://perma.cc/37MY-CFR2].
7 Most of these Companies targeted are incorporated in Delaware, but are
headquartered primarily in California. Burdick et al., supra note 5; cf. Nina Yadava, John
C. Tang, Robert M. Tiefenbrun & Glenn R. McGillivray, Jones Day Discusses Shareholder
Lawsuits Concerning Diversity, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/10/05/jones-day-discusses-shareholderlawsuits-concerning-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/7CNJ-P3UZ].
8 See Amelia Miazad, Sex, Power, and Corporate Governance, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV.
1913, 1947 (2021) (“This marks a clear departure from the traditional shareholder focus
on adequate compliance, training, and reporting systems and is yet another power
example of a shift from an era of compliance to an era of culture.”).
9 See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws at 61, In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 1:16-cv-06728-JMF, 2018 WL 2191300
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26 2018); Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Derivative Actions,
In re Alphabet S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 19CV341522, 2020 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1493
(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2020); Complaint, Stein v. Knight, No. 18CV38553 (Or. Cir. Ct.
4
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Concurrently, institutional investors have made bold public
statements on their commitments to engage with companies to pressure
them to increase board diversity and be more transparent on their
current diversity practices.10 One could wonder if institutional investors
are concerned that they might be targeted next by such lawsuits. In any
case, we believe that they will be. Indeed, stakeholders and stockholders
will evaluate them not merely on their statements, but also on their
actions and whether their boards and the boards of the firms they invest
in remain largely homogenous.
Regardless of the outcome of such litigation, this Article raises a core
question that corporate law has yet to answer: Is the duty to diversify
and push for equality especially for women located within the firm and
its ownership structure? Moreover, if so, do institutional investors have
a duty to focus on corporate culture and specifically push for gender
equality in the boardroom?

Aug. 31, 2018); Miazad, supra note 8, at 1947; Kevin LaCroix, Nike Board Hit with
Sexual Misconduct-Related Derivative Suit, D&O DIARY (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/10/articles/director-and-officer-liability/nike-board-hitsexual-misconduct-related-derivative-suit/ [https://perma.cc/2PUX-QHM7].
10 See, e.g., BLACKROCK, OUR APPROACH TO ENGAGEMENT ON BOARD DIVERSITY 1
(2021), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentaryengaging-on-diversity.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD6Y-U5W5] (“This is why we expect
companies to . . . demonstrate how diversity is accounted for within the proposed
board’s composition.”); Rebecca Sherratt, Board Diversity Deliberations, in 8 PROXY
MONTHLY 5, 7 (2021), https://www.proxyinsight.com/wp-content/uploads/dlm_
uploads/2021/08/Proxy-Monthly-July-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ9H-NCXE] (noting
that “BlackRock voted against the re-election of AT&T nomination committee chair
Matthew Rose . . . due to concerns over insufficient steps taken to address board
diversity” and that “[BlackRock] expects companies to ‘disclose their approach to
ensuring appropriate board diversity . . . .’”); Phil Brown, Institutional Investors Turn Up
Pressure on Companies to Embrace Diversity, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Mar. 29, 2019)
https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/institutional-investors-turn-up-pressureon-companies-to-embrace-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/7SZN-M5EV] (“[T]he EY Center
for Board Matters singled out board composition and enhanced diversity as investors’
top priorities for companies.”); State Street Insists on Board Diversity Disclosure, FAIR PLAY
TALKS (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.fairplaytalks.com/2021/01/13/STATE-STREET-INSISTSBOARDS-DISCLOSE-ETHNIC-RACIAL-COMPOSITION/ [https://perma.cc/3PYR-9CZG]
(“State Street Global Advisors is the latest financial institution to insist that firms
disclose the racial and ethnic composition of their boards, applying further pressure on
companies to diversify their boards.”); Amy Whyte, State Street to Turn Up the Heat on
All-Male Boards, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.
com/ARTICLE/B1B4FH28YS3MR9/STATE-STREET-TO-TURN-UP-THE-HEAT-ONALL-MALE-BOARDS [https://perma.cc/S8H7-2XK4] (noting that State Street Global
Advisors “will update new proxy voting guidelines in 2020 for firms that have no
women on their board and have failed to engage in ‘successful dialogue on State Street
Global Advisor’s board diversity program’”).
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This Article presents the novel idea that institutional investors may
already have a fiduciary duty to advance gender equality in the firms in
which they invest. More specifically, we suggest that board members of
institutional investors who fail to ensure that diverse candidates are
selected to sit on the boards of the firms they invest in could be viewed
as breaching their existing fiduciary duties.
Institutional investors’ influence on corporate governance is hard to
overstate, as they are “universal owners.”11 Therefore, this Article
suggests that they can play this oversight role concerning gender
equality. Their weight as market actors could allow them to be more
effective in promoting equality than quotas and other controversial
State-mandated specific inclusion levels. After all, institutional
investors are in a unique position to direct firms’ actions.12 Their
influence stems notably from their focus on the long-term value of their
investments, which draws them to seek good governance.13
Fiduciary duties may seem at first blush an odd location within
corporate law for gender equality requirements. It is unquestionably a
novel place. Nevertheless, it is through fiduciary duties that the State
articulates the behavior expected of duty holders. Indeed, fiduciary
duties allow the State to deputize duty holders to act in ways that reflect
widely accepted public governance norms.
11 SHAREACTION, ‘FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF INVESTMENT INTERMEDIARIES: INITIAL
QUESTIONS’ RESPONSE FROM SHAREACTION 5 (2016), https://shareaction.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/LawCommStakeholder.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL8U-U3MU]
[hereinafter FIDUCIARY DUTIES].
12 See infra Part IV; see, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber,
Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate
Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2020) (arguing that index funds have taken
a leading role in challenging management to advance board diversity and corporate
sustainability); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2029-30 (2019)
(noting that index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public
companies and have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public
companies and the economy); Jill E. Fisch, Asaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA.
L. REV. 17, 17 (2020) (noting that ETFs and index funds dictate capital flows); Ronald
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 863 (2013)
(recognizing the reconcentration of equity ownership in the hands of institutional
investors); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (2020) (“Because high profile
contests between activist shareholders and boards often have a significant effect on firm
value, the Big Three have strong direct incentives to acquire information and vote
intelligently.”).
13 See Barzuza et al., supra note 12, at 1258.
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The following reasons underscore why establishing a fiduciary duty
to focus on corporate culture, diversity, and gender equality may bolster
governance. First, social science underscores how diversity is an
important aspect of effective decision-making, risk oversight, and
innovation.14 Second, research demonstrates that, because groupthink
hobbles effective decisionmaking, companies with limited diversity
tend to underperform in comparison to their more diverse peers, take
excessive risk, and face reputational harm.15 Third, as long-term
investors in global public companies, institutional investors must
ensure that they invest in firms with a strong, independent, and effective
board that exercises high-quality oversight.16 Fourth, institutional
investors can best figure out how firms should diversify and strive for
gender equality based on their unique roles as dominant shareholders.17
Finally, and most importantly, creating a fiduciary duty for diversity and
gender equality establishes equality as a normative goal, reflecting the
public value equality already holds.18
Institutional investors monitor corporate governance issues, which
include paying attention to the diversity and quality of the members of
boards of directors of their investee companies. Their fiduciary duty
stems from their power to influence the composition of the
corporation’s (investee company) board. They need to make sure that
they pick the “best” qualified board members to (i) serve the corporate
business for the (ii) benefit of the corporation and its shareholders.
This fiduciary duty extends both to current and future shareholders,
investors, and beneficiaries, who invest their money but have no power
to choose their own directors. The board of directors also gains not only
by offering diverse experience and opinions, but also by recognizing its
duty to work together by committing to a unified corporate leadership.
Many institutional investors already behave as if they have a duty to
diversify19 Especially since the summer of 2020, which included mass

14

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.B.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.
18 See infra Part IV.
19 See Dylan Bruce & Peter Rasmussen, Analysis: Mandated Board Diversity
Takes Center Stage in 2021, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 16, 2020, 3:31 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-mandated-boarddiversity-takes-center-stage-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/UH83-MLDZ] [hereinafter Mandated
Board Diversity].
15
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Black Lives Matter protests, firms increasingly acknowledge their duty
to diversify.20
Firms are also responding to these changes and changing their
practices. This shift is evident from the organizational aspect — the rise
in Chief Diversity Officer (“CDO”) positions.21 In this sense, this Article
aims to restate what is already increasingly understood as an implicit
duty of institutional investors. It is thought that formalizing this duty
may hold potential as a means to improve governance.
There is broad agreement among scholars that corporate governance
suffers from a lack of diversity.22 It is not only women who face
exclusion from corporate power — for example, California recently
legislated inclusion for people of color and LGBT people.23 One group’s
20 According to Glassdoor, executive and leadership job openings have more than
doubled since the protests from the May 2020 death of George Floyd, with “chief
diversity officer” and “vice president of diversity & inclusion” being in-demand roles.
How Companies Are Honoring the Need for Diversity and Inclusion While Calling Out
Racial Inequity Within the Workplace, GLASSDOOR (July 15, 2020),
https://www.glassdoor.com/blog/how-companies-are-honoring-the-need-for-diversityand-inclusion-while-calling-out-racial-inequity-within-the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/
WS8Q-7SJZ] [hereinafter Companies Are Honoring].
21 The role of Chief Diversity Officer is “to work across the organization to optimize
organizational culture, align the organization’s diversity and inclusion goals with
business outcomes, and be able to respond to changes or policies that occur outside of
the organization that affect organizational culture, or employee and customer
populations.” Tiffany Jana, What Is a Chief Diversity Officer and Why Does Your Company
Need One?, MEDIUM (Sept. 18, 2018), https://tiffanyjana.medium.com/the-short-answer450d46e6ed17 [https://perma.cc/5NMT-WGYX]; see also Companies Are Honoring,
supra note 20; Ashley Peterson, Diversity Executives Are in Demand, LINKEDIN (Jan. 7,
2021), https://www.linkedin.com/news/story/diversity-executives-are-in-demand-5331410/
[https://perma.cc/HNH5-2XKS].
22 Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on
Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291 (2009); Douglas Cumming, T.
Y. Leung & Oliver Rui, Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1572,
1572 (2015); Lisa M. Fairfax, “With Friends Like These . . .”: Toward a More Efficacious
Response to Affinity-Based Securities and Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REV. 63, 67 (2001);
Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s ‘Women on Boards’ Statute
and the Scope of Regulatory Competition, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 493, 493 (2019); Sarah
Haan, Corporate Governance and the Feminization of Capital, 74 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022); Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull & Katrin Scharfenkamp, Perceived
Roles of Women Directors on Supervisory Boards: Insights from a Qualitative Study, 33
GER. J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 5, 5 (2019); Faith Stevelman & Sarah C. Haan, Boards in
Informational Governance, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 179, 181 (2020). See generally IRVING
LESTER JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES (1982).
23 UNITED NATIONS, LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND: THE IMPERATIVE OF INCLUSIVE
DEVELOPMENT 55 (2016), https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/2016/full-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6WLR-F85C]; Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
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dominance infuses corporate governance with group-think and
deprives it of the critical analysis of opportunity and risk that diversity
brings. While many countries and states have tried various state-driven
approaches to regulate inclusion as well as gender equality, such
approaches face controversy and may not prove as effective as private
ordering solutions.24
Given the clear data on diversity’s benefits for good governance,
institutional investors could hold a fiduciary duty to advance diversity
and push for gender equality in the boardroom. This fiduciary duty to
change the old boys’ club culture and push for gender equality presents
a practical way to advance inclusion in corporate governance by placing
the burden on decision makers to implement diversity.
Many institutional investors already act as if such a duty already
exists.25 In fact, it crosses both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
The duty of care obligates leaders to make informed decisions in a
reasonably prudent fashion. We argue that the duty of loyalty also
encompasses a duty for diversity, gender equality, and inclusion.26
Directors must exercise oversight over a corporation and can be sued if
they fail to act and if the failure is further “sustained or systematic.”27
The current health situation only exacerbates the underlying
challenges that make action necessary. COVID-19 has laid bare the
gross disparity between workers who have caretaking responsibilities
Comm’n, Diversity Matters, Disclosure Works, and the SEC Can Do More: Remarks at
the Council of Institutional Investors Fall 2020 Conference (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-cii-2020-conference-20200922 [https://perma.cc/
96HA-U5UM] [hereinafter Diversity Matters]; see Danyelle Solomon, Connor Maxwell
& Abril Castro, Systemic Inequality: Displacement, Exclusion, and Segregation, How
America’s Housing System Undermines Wealth Building in Communities of Color, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 7, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/
reports/2019/08/07/472617/systemic-inequality-displacement-exclusion-segregation/
[https://perma.cc/9D98-D6PK].
24 See Darren Rosenblum & Yaron Nili, Board Diversity by Term Limits?, 71 ALA. L.
REV. 211, 258 (2019); Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More than a Woman:
Insights into Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 889
(2015).
25 Saijel Kishan, Investors Pressure Corporate America with Record Diversity Push,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2021, 5:51 AM GMT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2021-04-22/investors-pressure-corporate-america-with-record-diversity-push
[https://perma.cc/XC2X-HX57].
26 Strine and Brummer also support this thesis. Chris Brummer & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Duty and Diversity, 75 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
27 Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006)
(quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996));
Daniel Hemel & Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1630 (2018).
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and those who do not.28 With children and the elderly sheltering in
place, those in charge of their care cannot participate in the market
economy.29 Some have noted that this may harm women who tend to
bear more family care responsibilities.30 Firms need inclusive
governance to account for the risk of loss in productivity of those who
bear caretaking responsibilities, mainly women, and instituting a
fiduciary mandate may prove most effective at realizing this goal.
On the other hand, we have witnessed institutional investors stepping
up to ensure gender equality as part of diverse leadership teams in the
past few years.31 A wide range of corporate actors struggle to find
suitable remedies to advance our shared gender equality norms. For
example, David Solomon, Goldman Sachs’ CEO, committed to insisting
on at least one “diverse board candidate, with a focus on women” on
boards of companies they take public.32
28 Cf. Arica White, Leandris C. Liburd & Fátima Coronado, Addressing Racial and
Ethnic Disparities in COVID-19 Among School-Aged Children: Are We Doing Enough?,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 3, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/
issues/2021/21_0084.htm [https://perma.cc/R7KM-72Z5] (studying the disproportionate
impact of COVID-19 on minority group teenagers who are affected by working parents’
ability to provide oversight).
29 UNITED NATIONS, POLICY BRIEF: THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON WOMEN 13 (Apr. 9,
2020), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/report/
policy-brief-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-women/policy-brief-the-impact-of-covid-19-onwomen-en-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F962-HZEV]; Michal Agmon Gonnen, Women and
the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Gender Perspective on the Socio-economic Crisis and the
Opportunities for Change (on file with authors); COVID-19: Protecting People and
Societies, OECD (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/
covid-19-protecting-people-and-societies-e5c9de1a/ [https://perma.cc/FD8M-EFA7];
see Janani Umamaheswar & Catherine Tan, “Dad, Wash Your Hands”: Gender, Care
Work, and Attitudes Toward Risk During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 6 SOCIUS: SOCIO. RSCH.
DYNAMIC WORLD 1, 1 (2020).
30 See Sarah Bradshaw, Engendering Development and Disasters, 39 DISASTERS S54,
S54 (2014); Sarah Bradshaw & Maureen Fordham, Double Disaster: Disaster Through a
Gender Lens, in HAZARDS, RISKS AND DISASTERS IN SOCIETY 233, 233 (Andrew E. Collins,
Samantha Jones, Bernard Manyena & Janaka Jayawickrama eds., 2015); see also Helen
Jaqueline McLaren, Karen Rosalind Wong, Kieu Nga Nguyen & Komalee Nadeeka
Damayanthi Mahamadachchi, Covid-19 and Women’s Triple Burden: Vignettes from Sri
Lanka, Malaysia, Vietnam and Australia, 9 SOC. SCIS. 87, 87 (2020). See generally
Caroline Moser, Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training, 49
FEMINIST REV. 117 (1995) (discussing the development of gender planning for
households).
31 See infra Parts IV.C.1.a-b. One can note efforts such as that undertaken by
BlackRock and others focus on economic, social and governance goals (“ESG”) and
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) initiatives.
32 This announcement has implications for any new company that wants to go
public. If you want Goldman to be your underwriter and take you public, you have to
have at least one “diverse” board member, namely a woman. However, Goldman, like
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These initiatives appear to be part of a larger “paradigm shift” in
thinking about corporate governance recognizing the benefits of gender
diversity in management.33 However, this shift’s instigators still face
barriers, imbedded notably in current selection processes, investment
analysis, and due diligence.34 To help institutional investors push for
board gender equality, we are also proposing some solutions to these
problems. First, to address the lack of accessible information on
diversity, we suggest that public companies could have an obligation to
disclose, in proxy statements, data relating to diversity within their
ranks, especially the number of women. Second, we call on companies
to adopt new policies compatible with this imperative regarding search
committees and selection processes.
This Article accepts the premise that gender equality on its own
proves necessary and advantageous to investors, businesses, and
society. Studies have established that “high-performing boards are more
likely to exhibit gender balance and inclusive behaviors.”35 We believe
that the board can change the “old boys’ club” culture into a more
inclusive, gender equal and diverse culture, reducing the prevelance of
group-think and encouraging innovation. This is particularly true in
our “knowledge economy,”36 where companies depend on their
BlackRock, doesn’t have full equality on its board either. Only four of its board members
are women, out of the total number of eleven directors. Katie Mehnert, Why Goldman
Sachs’s Push for Diversity Is Unlikely to Drive Real Change, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 20,
2020), https://hbr.org/2020/02/why-goldman-sachss-push-for-diversity-is-unlikely-todrive-real-change [https://perma.cc/UTX6-FZJX]; Hugh Son, Goldman Won’t Take
Companies Public Without ‘At Least One Diverse Board Candidate,’ CEO Says, CNBC (Jan.
23, 2020, 5:57 PM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/23/goldman-wont-takecompanies-public-that-dont-have-at-least-one-diverse-board-candidate-ceo-says.html
[https://perma.cc/Y7UR-QY54].
33 Anat Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’: When Tech Employees Revolt!, 80 MD.
L. REV. 120, 128 (2020) [hereinafter Times They Are a-Changin’].
34 See Stephanie Bornstein, Disclosing Discrimination, 101 B.U. L. REV. 287, 331
(2021).
35 Mike Fucci & Terri Cooper, The Inclusion Imperative for Boards: Redefining Board
Responsibilities to Support Organizational Inclusion, DELOITTE (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/value-of-diversity-and-inclusion/
redefining-board-responsibilities-to-support-organizational-inclusion.html [https://perma.
cc/AQE8-6D83]; see DELOITTE, TOWARD GENDER PARITY: WOMEN ON BOARDS INITIATIVE 2
(2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/economics/articles/toward-gender-paritywomen-on-boards-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/L57Y-PKG7].
36 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1-18 (2019). Also,
Powell and Snellman define the knowledge economy as “production and services based
on knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to an accelerated pace of technological
and scientific advance, as well as rapid obsolescence. The key components of a
knowledge economy include a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities than on

ALON-BECK_AGMON-GONNEN_ROSENBLUM MACRO V3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

112

University of California, Davis

11/8/2021 11:16 AM

[Vol. 55:nnn

employees to provide the human capital that helps the firm grow and
compete in this dynamic, complex, and ever-changing world.37
The corporate sector drives our lives, economies, political leadership,
environment, and even cultural norms.38 Boards of directors hold an
important role in firm governance. They establish firms’ mission and
vision. The board is responsible for organizational planning, including
determining and monitoring the corporation’s performance,
compliance, policies, and financial statements.
Women do not have equal leadership representation in firm
governance.39 Women, as employees in these firms, do not have equal
bargaining powers with the firm and lack access to information.40 In
turn, this situation contributes to the systemic problem of gender
inequality. Institutional investors could have the duty to require that
investee firms disclose information on company policies with regards to
the gender board composition, and take into account the issue of
women’s equal representation in firm governance. This Article attempts
to delineate the nature of that potential duty.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I will address the general
efforts to advance gender equality in the boardroom.41 Part II will
present a fiduciary duty to diversify.42 Parts III and IV will consider how
physical inputs or natural resources . . . .” Walter W. Powell & Kaisa Snellman, The
Knowledge Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 199, 201 (2004).
37 See Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’, supra note 33, at 123 (“There is a
shortage in skilled labor that contributes to a ‘war for talent’ where large companies,
especially tech companies, aggressively compete for talent.”) (footnote omitted).
38 See BRIAN ROACH, CORPORATE POWER IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 2 (2007),
https://www.economicsnetwork.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Brian%20Roach/Corporate_Po
wer_in_a_Global_Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5UL-8JTN] (“In the traditional
economic view, corporations are entities that provide maximal benefits to society when
they continually seek greater profits . . . . [T]his view holds little validity – MNCs are
unlikely to provide the greatest social benefit through their own volition. All those
impacted by the decisions of multinationals must be given an acknowledged voice
through existing or new institutional arrangements. Realizing the full potential of
MNCs to serve the welfare of society will require a mixture of voluntary initiatives,
market forces, and regulations.”).
39 Regarding the underrepresentation of women, see Jamillah Williams, Diversity as
a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1687 (2019). See generally David E. Pozen, Freedom
of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1138
(2017) (describing FOIA’s procedural obstacles).
40 See generally Kate Bahn, Understanding the Importance of Monopsony Power in the
U.S. Labor Market, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (July 5, 2018),
https://equitablegrowth.org/understanding-the-importance-of-monopsony-power-inthe-u-s-labor-market/ [https://perma.cc/N2J3-QQPX].
41 See infra Part I.
42 See infra Part II.
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institutional investors may come to implement this fiduciary duty.43 We
will conclude by suggesting that a fiduciary duty may be an effective
internal governance mechanism that could improve good governance
through gender equality.44
I.

RATIONALES FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN THE BOARDROOM

[F]iduciary law is not a static concept, nor is it tied to a single
investment theory. Rather, it is a flexible set of principles that have
been subject to varying interpretations over time.
—James Hawley, Keith Johnson, and Ed Waitzer45
In 2020 and beyond, corporate boardroom diversity, particularly
gender inequality, is a highly contested corporate law and governance
issue. Gender inequality continues to be the oldest form of inequality in
human history.46 The latest corporate governance reforms have mostly
failed to address this problem.47 To achieve social equality, it is crucial
to reach equal representation of women in boardrooms.
While we have seen significant improvements in gender equality,
evidence shows that market forces may bring on even more remarkable
progress on that front.48 Disparate jurisdictions have grappled with this
challenge through legislation, in which the state plays a central role in
fostering change.49 This Article presents a novel angle: rather than
43

See infra Parts III, IV.
See infra Conclusion.
45 James Hawley, Keith Johnson & Ed Waitzer, Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance,
4 ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION MGMT. 4, 7 (2011).
46 Archeologists and historians found that gender inequalities can be traced to our
pre-history, even before written records emerged. See Marta Cintas-Peña & Leonardo
García Sanjuán, Gender Inequalities in Neolithic Iberia: A Multi-Proxy Approach, 22(4)
EUR. J. ARCHEOLOGY 499, 516 (2019).
47 See infra Part I.D.
48 See VICKY PRYCE, WOMEN VS CAPITALISM: WHY WE CAN’T HAVE IT ALL IN A FREE
MARKET ECONOMY 1-44 (2019).
49 See, e.g., Billy Culleton, State Lawmakers Continue Push to Increase Diversity in
Corporate Boardrooms, MULTISTATE (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.multistate.us/
insider/2021/3/17/state-lawmakers-continue-push-to-increase-diversity-in-corporateboardrooms [https://perma.cc/PV53-WAKS] (“In 2018, California Governor Jerry
Brown (D) signed landmark legislation (CA AB 826) mandating that publicly traded
corporations based in California have a specified number of female directors on their
board depending on the board’s size. Two years later, California lawmakers enacted
another bill (CA AB 979) to expand the original law to require that at least one director
on a corporate board come from an underrepresented community (defined as someone
who self-identifies as Black, African American, Latino, Asian, or Native American) by
the end of 2021. Following California’s decision, a total of seven states — California,
44
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advocate for legislatively mandated inclusion, it suggests that all firms,
including institutional investors, should bear a fiduciary duty to act
towards gender equality.
The fiduciary duty to push for gender equality has unique attributes
regarding all firms, especially for institutional investors, because their
duties lie in the crossroads between law and economics.50 The fiduciary
duty of institutional investors requires them to act in their investors’
and beneficiaries’ best interests when making investment decisions on
their behalf.51 Through corporate and trust fiduciary duties,
institutional investors enforce good governance norms in many ways —
perhaps most notably by requiring firms to engage in a long-term
strategy. For that reason, we suggest the institutional investors have a
fiduciary duty to push for gender equality.
Thanks to global structural changes in capital management, financial
markets, economic theory, and risk management, our understanding of
fiduciary principles continues to evolve.52 Moreover, there is substantial
criticism from economics and behavioral finance scholars on the
current investment and risk management practices due to the
underlying popular modern portfolio theory.53 This Article presents the
recent changes and examines a new way for fiduciary practices and
principles to evolve to align with sustainable long-term investment
goals.
Fiduciary duties are designed to protect beneficiaries (and society)
from abuse by fiduciary agents. Local culture, legal structures,
authorizing statutes, regulations, practice codes, and court decisions
impact how fiduciary principles are conceptualized.54 Accordingly, over
Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington — have
enacted some type of board diversity measures. Specifically, legislation falls into one of
three broad categories: (1) mandating board diversity; (2) encouraging board diversity;
or (3) requiring disclosure of board diversity information”).
50 See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 24, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/24/aneconomic-theory-of-fiduciary-law/ [https://perma.cc/35PW-PWWR].
51 See U.S. DEP’T LABOR, MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (2020),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/
publications/meeting-your-fiduciary-responsibilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY4W-XW4K].
52 See Hawley et al., supra note 45, at 4.
53 See Andrea Devenow & Ivo Welch, Rational Herding in Financial Economics, 40
EUR. ECON. REV. 603, 612 (1996); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 264 (1979); John
Montgomery, Economic Analysis in ERISA Litigation over Fiduciary Duties, HARV. L. SCH.
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 24, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/12/24/
economic-analysis-in-erisa-litigation-over-fiduciary-duties/ [https://perma.cc/99R9-SZNL].
54 See infra Part II.A.
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the past forty years, the application of these fiduciary principles has
evolved in response to changing circumstances and investor demand.
Today, the stark lack of representation of female directors in the
boardrooms of major public and private corporations has become a
significant focus of the current international evolution in fiduciary
thinking, due to the fact that it involves fiduciary issues of
intergenerational equity55 and fairness and has financial implications.56
A concern for intergenerational justice, and specifically for the
advancement of women’s participation in the corporate world, leads us
to take a closer look at economic theories. It supports a proposal to
change the current institutional design and extend our current
understanding of fiduciary duties to include a duty to diversify as well
as to gender equality. Outside the United States, a new movement
advocates for a potentially disruptive (re)evolution of fiduciary duties
— as evidenced by the Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century report.57
In the past few decades, institutional investors’ fiduciary duties have
been understood to forbid any investment decision that might sacrifice
financial returns for other social imperatives, such as equality.58 After
conducting a comparative analysis of the principal common law
jurisdictions, our view is that fiduciary duties to invest prudently can
be extended in some jurisdictions to include investment decisions that
promote equality for women. However, regarding the United States,
there is a need for legal reform to encourage investors to consider the
consequences of their decisions on different stakeholders, including
women’s equality.
55 To improve intergenerational equity, we must advance the rights and
opportunities for current women and future generations.
56 For more on the evolution of fiduciary duty, see Hawley et al., supra note 45, at
4 (“Years of focus on the fiduciary duty of prudence has generated myopic investment
herding behaviors, undermined intergenerational pension equity, and disrupted
attention to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality. Reclaiming fiduciary duty
balance between prudence, loyalty and impartiality is critical to sustaining pension
promises.”).
57 See RORY SULLIVAN, WILL MARTINDALE, ELODIE FELLER & ANNA BORDON, FIDUCIARY
DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 11 (2015), https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=1378
[https://perma.cc/2XA6-4C6N] [hereinafter FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY]; see
also ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND
PROFIT 1 (2020); COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD
39 (2018).
58 See Tamar Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Sept. 10, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/10/the-rise-of-fiduciary-law/
[https://perma.cc/DVS5-EV9N]. See generally Fiduciary Duties, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 11,
2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/the_business_
lawyer/find_by_subject/buslaw_tbl_mci_fiduciaryduty/ [https://perma.cc/6KTN-MH66].
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Social science consistently demonstrates how diverse groups make
better decisions than homogeneous ones.59 By contrast, men’s current
domination in boardrooms is at the root of a critical shortcoming in
today’s governance: group-think.60 Corporate governance duties might
reflect the value of diversity as a central core of good governance.
A. Corporate Boardrooms and Gender-Based Segregation
Women face exclusion even though substantial arguments support
their inclusion. While women hold half of all employment, most firms’
organizational charts are radically less balanced at their pinnacles.61
Boards hover around 20% women. C-suite positions are far fewer, with
women serving as only 5% of CEOs.62
To focus on governance, boards play a central role. Global firms
influence billions of people’s lives and drive our politics, environment
and cultural norms.63 The underrepresentation of women on boards

59 See SUNDIATU DIXON-FYLE, KEVIN DOLAN, VIVIAN HUNT & SARA PRINCE, DIVERSITY
WINS: HOW INCLUSION MATTERS 3 (2020); Evan Apfelbaum, The Trouble with
Homogeneous Teams, 59 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 43, 43 (2017); David Rock & Heidi
Grant, Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter [https://perma.cc/X9PG-JLAB].
60 See Darren Rosenblum, California Dreaming?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1457 (2019)
[hereinafter California Dreaming?].
61 For the first time in almost a decade, at the beginning of 2020, women held the
majority of jobs (50.04%) in the U.S. labor markets, according to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Jack Kelly, Women Now Hold More Jobs than Men in the U.S. Workforce, FORBES
(Jan. 13, 2020, 10:43 AM EST), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/01/13/
women-now-hold-more-jobs-than-men/#7addc8db8f8a [https://perma.cc/PD3E-K4KC].
62 Women Serve As CEOs on Only 5% of Fortune 500 Companies, BIG NEWS NETWORK
(Feb. 25, 2020, 1:08 GMT), https://www.bignewsnetwork.com/news/264124296/
women-serve-as-ceos-on-only-5-of-fortune-500-companies [https://perma.cc/YU4QDDQ3]; see also 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 3 (2019),
https://2020wob.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2020WOB_Gender_Diversity_
Index_Report_Oct2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WJW-D94Z]. “The percentage of
women in the 100 largest companies is 27.7%; in the 1,000 smallest companies it is
15.7%.” Id.
63 See ROACH, supra note 38, at 2 (“In the traditional economic view, corporations
are entities that provide maximal benefits to society when they continually seek greater
profits . . . . this view holds little validity – MNCs are unlikely to provide the greatest
social benefit through their own volition. All those impacted by the decisions of
multinationals must be given an acknowledged voice through existing or new
institutional arrangements. Realizing the full potential of MNCs to serve the welfare of
society will require a mixture of voluntary initiatives, market forces, and regulations.”);
Cassia Peralta, Storytelling for Business Success, WHARTON MAG. (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://magazine.wharton.upenn.edu/digital/storytelling-for-business-success/
[https://perma.cc/PQ5M-SCEV].
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affects firm governance as the board establishes the corporation’s
mission and vision. They select, vet, and monitor the executives and
other directors and their organizational planning defines and monitors
the firm’s performance, compliance, policies, and financial statements.
However, directors tend to favor people that are just like them, and
insiderism still defines the selection of candidates for board and C-suite
positions.64 Directors may come from other boards and senior
management without formal procedures to identify potential
candidates. (Un)conscious biases may explain this exclusion. 65 For
example, if four finalists — three men and one woman — compete for
a board slot in a hypothetical scenario, her chances tend closer to zero
than 25% because of unconscious biases.66 Women may appear inferior,
less reliable, and unsuited for leadership.67 Additionally, they might also
be viewed as prioritizing family or as emotional or irrational.68

64 See Luc Renneboog & Yang Zhao, Director Networks, Turnover, and Appointments
11 (Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 534, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3164442_code1664187.pdf?
abstractid=3045221&mirid=1 [https://perma.cc/A9JU-A5YR].
65
Johanne Grosvold, Where Are All the Women? Institutional Context and the Prevalence
of Women on the Corporate Board of Directors, 50 BUS. & SOC. 531, 538 (2011); see Amir N.
Licht, Culture and Law in Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
LAW AND GOVERNANCE 129, 154 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018); Amir
N. Licht, Stakeholder Impartiality: A New Classic Approach for the Objectives of the Corporation,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 18, 2019), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2019/10/18/stakeholder-impartiality-a-new-classic-approach-for-theobjectives-of-the-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/7CEH-85Y9]; Amir N. Licht & Reneé
Adams, Shareholders and Stakeholders Around the World: The Role of Values, Culture, and Law
in Directors’ Decisions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 12, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/12/shareholders-and-stakeholders-around-theworld-the-role-of-values-culture-and-law-in-directors-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/Y88VG5XY].
66 Stefanie K. Johnson, David R. Hekman & Elsa T. Chan, If There’s Only One
Woman in Your Candidate Pool, There’s Statistically No Chance She’ll Be Hired, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303003812_If_There’s_
Only_One_Woman_in_Your_Candidate_Pool_There’s_Statistically_No_Chance_She’ll
_Be_Hired [https://perma.cc/P9HF-EQMD].
67 Cf. Katherine B. Coffman, Christine L. Exley & Muriel Niederle, The Role of
Beliefs in Driving Gender Discrimination, 67 MGMT. SCI. 3551 (2021),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=60385
[https://perma.cc/P36WL4RA] (explaining how experiments show that discrimination against female workers
seem to be driven by in-group preferences).
68
See PRYCE, supra note 48, at 147, 151.
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Within a gender homogeneous group, such biases become more
commonplace.69 Within orchestras, experiments revealed blind
auditions led to more inclusion.70 The corporate world, with its
widespread notions of “fitness,” cannot easily adapt. These factors have
led to a market failure of widespread exclusion that mandates
legislation.71
B. Rationales for Gender Equality in Corporate Boardrooms
There are several arguments in favor of gender equality on boards.
The first is that it enhances equality and contributes to a better society.
The second is that a diverse board sends an important signal to investors
and both current and potential women employees: the firm is sensitive
to gender equality issues and the women the firm employs can achieve
their ambitions just like their male counterparts. The third is that a
heterogeneous board is more effective and improves decision making.72

69

CAROLINE CRIADO PEREZ, INVISIBLE WOMEN: DATA BIAS IN A WORLD DESIGNED FOR
MEN 269-70 (2019).
70
For instance, there used to be a significant gender gap between women and men
in symphony orchestras. Following a lawsuit, auditions were held behind a curtain,
with members of the selecting body only hearing the musicians. As a result, the number
of women in orchestras soon reached 45%. See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse,
Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 715, 719, 738 (2000).
71
PEREZ, supra note 69, at 93-95.
72 Laura Liswood, Women Directors Change How Boards Work, H ARV . B US. R EV .
(Feb. 17, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/02/women-directors-change-how-boards-work
[https://perma.cc/M333-CEFF]; see Katherine W. Phillips, Katie L. Lijenquist &
Margaret A. Neale, Better Decisions Through Diversity, KELLOGGINSIGHT (Oct. 1, 2010),
https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/better_decisions_through_diversity
[https://perma.cc/5DPA-BEQ3] (“In the study, diverse groups outperformed more
homogeneous groups, not because of an influx of new ideas, but because diversity
triggered more careful information processing that is absent in homogeneous groups.”).
The appeal of the different rationales for gender equality explored in this Article varies
according to one’s conception of corporate entities’ purpose. Those who take the stand
that the sole purpose of the company is to maximize the profits of its members will
focus on the arguments that without equality on the board, the business reputation will
suffer and, therefore, business financial prospects will as well. See infra Part I.B for a
discussion on reputational harm and high costs of monitoring labor. Others, who
believe that a company’s role is also to promote greater social good (with variable
boundaries), believe that gender equality should be promoted generally and specifically
within the board of directors, as long as it does not directly harm profitability.
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The Advancement of Women’s Rights Contribute to a More
Equal and Better Society

Equality is a fundamental principle at the base of any democratic
society. The right to equality is protected in many international
conventions, including The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women.73 It requires us to treat all
human beings equally unless there is a relevant difference between
them.74 Countless books and articles in various fields have been written
on what the reference group is, who is equal, what is the relevant
difference, and what is the equal ratio.75 This Article does not purport
to analyze these complex questions.
On the one hand, it is generally accepted that sex does not constitute
a relevant difference regarding service on the board of directors. In other
words, equality requires that a person’s sex not be considered when
appointing a director to the board, as this is an irrelevant difference.
On the other hand, promoting equality for women on the board of
directors requires gender-based considerations. This follows the
principle of affirmative action, which states that candidates from
historically discriminated groups should be preferred for positions in
bodies where seats are limited, such as boards of directors.76 Quotas,
preferential treatments (such as an additional point on a scoring chart

73 In 1979, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”), which is also known as “the international
women’s bill of rights.” Gender Equality, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/
global-issues/gender-equality (last visited Feb. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6W36-2V9S].
“[A]ll but seven countries of the 193-member states have ratified it. The holdouts
include some you might expect — Iran, Palau, Somalia, North and South Sudan and
Tonga — and one that might surprise. The United States.” International Women’s Rights,
EQUAL MEANS EQUAL, https://equalmeansequal.com/international-womens-rights/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/KAE2-8QK7].
74 According to Aristotle: “equality consists in the same treatment of similar
persons.” ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 286 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943). If one is the same,
one is to be treated the same; if one is different, one is to be treated differently (as to
Aristotle theory today, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 6 (3d ed. 2016)). In
order to establish discrimination, one must relate to the existence of an unjustified
distinction. Distinguishing between groups based on relevant differences does not, in
itself, constitute discrimination.
75 See, e.g., Dhirendra Prakash Saxena, The “Reference Group” Concept, 46 SOC. SCI.
155 (1971) (searching critically into the theory of “reference group”); Groups and
Individuals, STAN. UNIV. EQUAL. OPPORTUNITY & EDUC., https://edeq.stanford.edu/
sections/groups-and-individuals (last visited July 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V3FC3S3Z] (providing a list of readings about equality and opportunity in education).
76 On discrimination and affirmative action, see TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF
DISCRIMINATION LAW 80, 215 (2015); MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 133-145.
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for those in the preferred group), or a change in the threshold
requirements for members of such groups have served this purpose.77
The primary social importance of gender equality in the boardrooms
is its promotion of promoting social equality. Women are entitled to
enjoy the same human rights and fundamental freedoms as men.78
Women comprise half of the population, half of high school and higher
education graduates, and now half of the workforce. As such, they
should occupy a similar proportion on boards of directors.79
Furthermore, a gender-heterogeneous board of directors signals that
women can aspire to hold high-level positions and may help fight the
belief that boards constituted mostly of white men are more responsible
and serious. Therefore, there are strong arguments that promoting
equality in the board of directors will also contribute to the social
good.80

77 Christopher McCrudden, A Comparative Taxonomy of “Positive Action” and
“Affirmative Action” Policies, in NON-DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 157,
163-65 (Reiner Schulze ed., 2011).
78 International human rights treaties require states to take proactive steps to ensure
that women’s human rights are respected by law and to eliminate discrimination,
inequalities, and practices that negatively affect women’s rights. There are few decisions
regarding the participation of women in decision-making forums. See Meetings
Coverage, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2242
(2015) to Improve Implementation of Landmark Text on Women, Peace, Security
Agenda, U.N. Meetings Coverage SC/12076 (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.un.org/press/
en/2015/sc12076.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/K8NL-WA3V]. On participating in healthrelated decision-making, see Rep. of the Global Health Crises Task Force, ¶ 78, U.N.
Doc. A/72/50 (2017); as well as the board of the World Health Organization, and Clare
Wenham, Julia Smith & Rosemary Morgan, Comment, Covid-19: The Gendered Impacts
of the Outbreak, 395 LANCET 847, 847 (2020). See generally United Nations Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979
(noting that “the Chapter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and growth of the human person and in the equal rights of men
and women”).
79 Tara Law, Women Are Now the Majority of the U.S. Workforce — Working Women
Still Face Serious Challenges, TIME (Jan. 16, 2020), https://time.com/5766787/womenworkforce/ [https://perma.cc/BT6J-4MU7]; Population, Female (% of Total Population),
WORLD BANK (2019), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS
[https://perma.cc/8879-U2ZR]; Carlie Porterfield, Women — More Than Half of U.S.
Population — Only See Themselves on Screen 38% of the Time, Study Finds, FORBES (Dec.
3, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2020/12/03/women-morethan-half-of-us-population-only-see-themselves-on-screen-38-of-the-time-study-finds/
?sh=43ebe7797108 [https://perma.cc/6A33-B7SG]; Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser,
Gender Ratio, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2019), https://ourworldindata.org/gender-ratio
[https://perma.cc/MR4Q-Q4MY].
80 Cf. International Women’s Rights, supra note 73 (discussing how vast majority of
countries have ratified “the international women’s bill of rights,” pointing out the
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Reputation Signaling

Striving for gender equality can result in reputational benefits: gender
equal boards can be used as a signaling tool to investors about a firm’s
commitment to recruit the best people as directors.81 Indeed, an
increase in board gender equality keeps investors apprised of firm
preferences. Investors should note that a gender-diverse board must be
interpreted as a sign of preference for equality and a strong commitment
to shareholder value.
Logically, if a board is composed entirely of individuals from a given
demographic subcategory (as of now not very young white men), it
seems clear that the company has not sought to recruit the best. It
signals to investors that the board’s nominations and governance
committee and the firm’s top management team may not be seeking the
right candidates to help lead the enterprise. Indeed, in most western
countries, women constitute half of the university’s business
administration, economics, accounting, and law graduates, as well as
half of those who graduate with distinctions.82 Statistically, women
should also constitute close to half of the people with the skillsets
required to become among the best directors.
3.

Good Governance and Group-Think

While womanhood’s shared identity does not create a monolithic
experience, the historical exclusion of women implies that women’s
inclusion in corporate boards will bring experiential diversity. This, in
turn, brings new and different perspectives to corporate decisionmaking table.83 Diverse experiences lead to distinct cognitive processes.
United States is not one of those countries as it never made it to the Senate floor for
voting, and that Congress is comprised of only twenty percent women).
81 Stephen Bear, Noushi Rahman & Corinne Post, The Impact of Board Diversity and
Gender Composition on Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Reputation, 97 J. BUS.
ETHICS 207, 211 (2010) (showing how it impacts firm reputation); Lisa Wardell, Board
Diversity Propels Performance, CORP. BOARD MEMBER, https://boardmember.com/boarddiversity-propels-performance/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/75STRJ99].
82 Elizabeth Olson, Women Make Up Majority of U.S. Law Students for First Time,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/business/dealbook/
women-majority-of-us-law-students-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/WHG6-ZPRZ];
Matt Symonds, Inspiring the Next Generation of Women at Business School, FORBES (May
20, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattsymonds/2021/05/20/inspiring-the-nextgeneration-of-women-at-business-school/?sh=146f80181367 [https://perma.cc/ZM74QU3V].
83 SCOTT PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF IN THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 229-33 (Earl Lewis & Nancy Cantor eds., 2017). Indeed, it is their experience,
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It is here that having diverse people on a board (or in any group
decision-making process) makes a difference.84 Women may pose more
challenging questions, leading to better information for the board, as
various studies have shown they often follow more methodical
reasoning.85 Other studies assert that women may have more risk
awareness.86 In bringing distinct perspectives to board debates,
resulting decisions will be more robust. Howard Gardner argues that
women bring a different sort of intelligence to their engagements.87
Finally, women’s presence on boards of directors may help break issues
of “group-think”88 that exist in homogeneous groups in which everyone
concurs on key issues.
Furthermore, men’s domination of corporate boards appears to
exacerbate the risks of entrenchment. Scholars have demonstrated how
male dominance reproduces itself.89 Male incumbents have a double
not their identity, that makes a difference in analyzing problems and making decisions
about them. Women cross every category of identity and experience, and the
perspectives they bring to work, vary accordingly. Intersectionality theory reflects these
differences in how women are treated distinctly across such variation in experience. See
also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (explaining how
identity politics problematically does not focus on differences within groups).
84 Sex diversity constitutes a subset of broader diversity, which would include race,
class, sexual orientation, and ability. Some other contexts might require considering
religion, national origin, language, and education. See generally Crenshaw, supra note
83, at 1242 (discussing the intersectionality of race and sex in many contexts).
85 See Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More than a Woman: Insights into
Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 910-11 (2015).
86 See Christine R. Harris, Michael Jenkins & Dale Glaser, Gender Differences in Risk
Assessment: Why Do Women Take Fewer Risks than Men?, 1 JUDGEMENT & DECISION
MAKING 48, 48-50 (2006).
87 Different strengths in certain areas of intelligence correlate with sex. Gardner
defined the first seven intelligences in Frames of Mind in 1983. He added the last two
in Intelligence Reframed in 1999. Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory began as an
attempt to define what intelligence is. According to Gardner’s theory, humans have
multiple intelligences. Gardner has identified nine distinct intelligences. Among them,
mathematical logical intelligence which is the ability to use numbers effectively and to
think logically and orderly, which is attributed mainly to men; and interrelation
intelligence, which is the ability to discern and respond to other people’s needs, motives
and emotions. This intelligence is attributed mainly to women. See generally HOWARD
GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND (1983); HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED (1999).
88 See STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 155 (2008) (detailing the role of the board monitoring management); Jill E.
Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1997); Rosenblum &
Nili, supra note 24, at 223.
89 To understand this phenomenon, it is relevant to turn to political science
literature on male overrepresentation in politics, which sheds light on this issue in the
corporate context. It is for this reason that Bjarnegård (2013) and Murray (2014) in the
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advantage over outsiders (women often being outsiders): firstly, they
often come from socio-economically privileged backgrounds and
benefit from privileged educations, which lead to presumptions of
competence for highly ranked jobs. Secondly, once in those positions,
they can leverage the situation to “acquir[e] [the] skill[s], asset[s], or
talent[s]” understood to be required to succeed as a director or
executive.90 Through hard work and advantageous placement, one can
acquire abilities that have a market value. Not only do firms hesitate to
force out these incumbents, but incumbents themselves think their
contributions to the firm are unique and essential.91
Lastly, nominating committees tend to choose people who have skills
familiar and similar to theirs.92 Leaders find replacements for
themselves in a process of corporate elite reproduction.93 As firms
recruit and promote people, “forces [exist] which lead the men who
manage to reproduce themselves in kind.”94 The corporation’s leaders
view themselves as the standard-bearers for success; their skills prove
essential for the firm’s continued profitability. These leaders, in turn,
identify for promotion those subordinates whose skills mirror their
own.95 It is no coincidence that men dominate such elites, frequently
leading to entrenchment issues such as those mentioned previously.
tradition of Eveline (1994; 1998) call for a shift in how gender inequality is
problematized. See NATALIE GALEA & LOUISE CHAPPELL, THE POWER OF MASCULINE
PRIVILEGE: COMPARING MALE OVERREPRESENTATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL AND
CONSTRUCTION SECTORS 8 (2015); Joan Eveline, Heavy, Dirty and Limp Stories: Male
Advantage at Work, in GENDER AND INSTITUTIONS: WELFARE, WORK AND CITIZENSHIP 90,
90-106 (Moira Gatens & Alison Mackinnon eds., 1998); Joan Eveline, The Politics of
Advantage, 9 AUSTL. FEMINIST STUD. 129, 129-54 (1994). See generally ELIN BJARNEGÅRD,
GENDER, INFORMAL INSTITUTION AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT: EXPLAINING MALE
DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION (2013).
90 Alison Bailey, Privilege: Expanding on Marilyn Frye’s “Oppression”, 29 J. SOC. PHIL.
104, 109 (1998).
91 Interview transcript is on file with the authors.
92 See generally ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (2d
ed. 1993) (explaining that as men recruit and promote people, they find candidates that
are reproductions of themselves, having the same skills as they do, which they view as
valuable to the company).
93 Id. at 68.
94 Id. at vii.
95 “The greater the tendency for a group of people to try to reproduce themselves,
the more constraining becomes the emphasis on conformity.” Id. at 68; see also Amanda
K. Packel, Government Intervention into Board Composition: Gender Quotas in Norway and
Diversity Disclosures in the United States, 21 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 192, 198 (2016)
(reviewing AARON DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW,
GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY (2015)) (explaining that “[t]he board nomination process
relies very heavily on social networks . . . which tends to result in newly appointed
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C. Current Efforts
Current legislative efforts vary significantly.96 In the past seventeen
years, significant legislation has become increasingly widespread.97
After summarizing quotas, we will describe softer remedies that have
been brought to bear on inclusion.
Many European countries, including the Scandinavian countries, as
well as France, Belgium, and Italy, have enacted laws requiring between
one-third and 40% of board members to be women.98 These laws led to
major changes. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), at of the end of 2019, the
proportion of women on the boards of the listed companies in Iceland
was 46%; in Norway, which passed the law in 2009, the proportion
reached 40%; the proportion in France was 45%; Sweden was 38%; Italy
was 36%; and Belgium was also 36%.99 Within a decade, all affected
companies located in countries with diversity quotas reached the targets
set by law.100 Despite the success shown in countries that have
implemented these laws, the average representation of women on
corporate boards in other OECD countries hovers around 21%.101
directors with sociodemographic characteristics similar to those of existing directors”).
See generally DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN
WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014).
96 See Heike Mensi-Klarbach & Cathrnie Seierstad, Gender Quotas on Corporate
Boards: Similarities and Differences in Quota Scenarios, 17 EUR. MGMT. REV. 615, 622
(2020).
97 See Ruth V. Aguilera, Venkat Kuppuswamy & Rahul Anand, What Happened
When India Mandated Gender Diversity on Boards, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://hbr.org/2021/02/what-happened-when-india-mandated-gender-diversity-onboards [https://perma.cc/6P84-LDPV].
98 See Alison Smale & Claire Cain Miller, Germany Sets Gender Quota in Boardrooms,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/europe/
german-law-requires-more-women-on-corporate-boards.html [https://perma.cc/BK7AYNN2]; Margarethe Wiersema & Marie Lousie Mors, What Board Directors Really Think
of Gender Quotas, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-boarddirectors-really-think-of-gender-quotas [https://perma.cc/PR9Z-2RCH].
99 Employment: Female Share of Seats on Boards of the Largest Publicly Listed
Companies, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?
queryid=54753 (last visited July 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/QP5P-5JLD] [hereinafter
Female Share] (data extracted as of Aug. 17, 2020).
100 Mensi-Klarbach & Seierstad, supra note 96; Helena Vieira, Quotas Have Led to
More Women on Corporate Boards in Europe, THE LONDON SCH. OF ECON. AND POL. SCI.
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2016/09/30/quotas-have-led-tomore-women-on-corporate-boards-in-europe/ [https://perma.cc/Y7TD-AQ76].
101 See Achieving Gender Balance in Corporate Leadership, ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/bac3ebfa-en/index.html?
itemId=/content/component/bac3ebfa-en (last visited July 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
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California passed a similar law in 2018 that has faced substantial
challenges in courts102 but has nonetheless inspired widespread
compliance.103 While quotas may prove effective, they involve the state’s
heavy intervention into governance. Next, we will consider softer
remedies for women inclusion.
Corporate governance codes, or best practice codes, may inspire firms
to comply. Civil society or administrative organizations, cohorts of
public companies, or institutional investors may set up standards for
K5LB-ZMBX] (data as of 2019); Female Share, supra note 99; What Big Data Can Tell Us
About Women on Boards, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
https://www.oecd.org/gender/data/what-big-data-can-tell-us-about-women-on-boards.htm
(last visited July 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/H3LL-GM9E] (data as of Mar. 2020).
102 See Meland v. Padilla, No. 2:19-cv-02288-JAM-AC, 2020 WL 1911545 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 20, 2020), rev’d sub nom. Meland v. Weber, 2 F.4th 838 (9th Cir. 2021). The main
argument against the quota system is that the state should not interfere with the
shareholders’ ownership of their company. Recently, in Meland v. Padilla, a federal
district court dismissed a lawsuit attempting to invalidate this new law on such grounds.
Id. The decision “suggests that courts will not be eager to interfere with legislative efforts
to promote diversity among directors of public companies.” William Savitt, Ryan A.
McLeod & Anitha Reddy, Federal District Court Dismissal of Challenge to Board Diversity
Statute, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/24/federal-district-court-dismissal-of-challengeto-board-diversity-statute/ [https://perma.cc/N6WG-WHWG]. Note that there is an
interest group behind this lawsuit and another suit in California state court (see
discussion below). Their main arguments are: “Treating people according to immutable
characteristics like sex violates the very notion of equality before the law. People should
be treated as individuals, not as members of a group they did not choose; The
government’s attempt to dictate the percentage of men and women on corporate boards
is discriminatory and violates the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee; A
government that can meddle with the composition of corporate boards can enlist
shareholders to run companies according to the state’s preferred social policies.”
Creighton Meland Jr. v. Shirley N. Weber, Secretary of State of California: Fighting
California’s Discriminatory Woman Quota Law, PAC. LEGAL FOUND., https://pacificlegal.
org/case/creighton-meland-v-alex-padilla-secretary-of-state-of-california/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/SKM7-TE98].
The other case that was filed first is Crest v. Alex Padilla (as amended), filed in
California State Court, was framed as a “taxpayer suit” that sought to enjoin Padilla, the
California Secretary of State, from expending taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed
resources to enforce or implement the statute, claiming violations of the equal
protection provisions of the California constitution. See Crest v. Padilla, No.
19STCV27561, 2019 WL 3771990 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2019). We will relate to
these arguments on the part regarding affirmative action.
103 See Rosenblum, California Dreaming?, supra note 60, at 1440. The statute requires
public companies with headquarters in the state to have at least one woman on their
boards by the end of 2019, and at least two or three women by the end of 2021 (two
women in companies with at least five board members, and three women on the board
with six members or more). Companies that do not meet this goal will face $100,000
and $300,000 fines.
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firms to follow. Countries with large public company sectors such as
Germany and the Netherlands have adopted comply-or-explain
legislation.104 For example, the U.K.’s independent regulator, the
Financial Reporting Council, (“FRC”), drafted a proposed corporate
governance code.105 The UK Stewardship Code, as it is called, added a
responsibility to strive toward gender diversity by advocating for
women’s appointments to corporate boards, executive positions, and
the workforce.106 Such efforts achieved mixed results, as was the case in
California, where a largely ineffective voluntary quota was in place prior
to the state’s 2018 mandate.107 United States disclosure rules also proved
to be largely unsuccessful.108

104 Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the Future of Nonfinancial Reporting,
21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317, 321 (2017).
105 FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2018),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EMC-M3SP].
106 FIN.
REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 4-5 (2020),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87/
Stewardship-Code_Final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ2Q-5HAZ].
107 See Rosenblum, California Dreaming?, supra note 60.
108 With regards to disclosures, it should be noted that in the United States, for
example, under applicable SEC disclosure rules, public companies are already required
to disclose whether they consider diversity in identifying nominees to the board of
directors. However, there is no mandate that the disclosure include identity-based
diversity factors, such as gender (or race or ethnicity). Therefore, in practice, public
companies have the flexibility to define diversity as they see fit, and according to studies,
such definitions typically include a wide range of factors, such as a director’s prior
professional experience. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2021); Proxy Disclosure
Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-9089, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23,
2009); FENWICK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND TRENDS: A COMPARISON OF
LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES AND SILICON VALLEY COMPANIES 17 (2019),
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Corporate_Governance_Survey_2019.p
df [https://perma.cc/9CDD-FCVR] (“[O]ne study found that during the four years after
the enactment of the SEC’s diversity disclosure rule, only half of the companies defined
diversity to include traditional factors such as gender, race, and ethnicity while over
80% used a definition of diversity that referenced a director’s prior professional
experience or other nonidentity-based factors. The report noted that to the extent the
disclosure rule was intended to produce more diversity on boards along sociodemographic lines, it would be more effective to require companies to include
disclosure about identity-based diversity factors such as gender, race, and ethnicity
rather than allowing companies to define diversity for themselves.”); Want to Join a
Corporate Board? Here’s How, FENWICK (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.fenwick.com/
insights/publications/want-to-join-a-corporate-board-heres-how [https://perma.cc/EX9W36W3]; see also Aaron A. Dhir, Corporate Reporting Under the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission’s Diversity Disclosure Rule: A Mixed-Methods Content Analysis 4
(Osgoode Hall L. Sch., Working Paper No. 66, 2014).
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Market solutions may also play an important role. Some of the world’s
largest and leading institutional investors have begun to consider
boards’ gender composition to foster greater inclusion.109 Each of these
institutional investors operates differently, but in aggregate, they have
come to exert substantial pressure.
D. The Limitations of Current Solutions
While some jurisdictions have adopted hard quotas and others pursue
softer measures, these efforts often rely on state intervention or on some
ownership structure, such as institutional investors’ corporate
structure. Yet, it is argued in this Article that the authority required to
effectively increase gender equality on corporate boards lies with private
actors, notably institutional investors.110 Shareholders do, after all, elect
the board. Institutional shareholders, such as public retirement funds,
hold the influence required to pressure firms to improve gender equality
at the board level.
While these efforts have already fostered some improvement in sex
diversity, this progress empowers critics to declare that only the private
sector should create, foster, and implement remedies for sex
inequality.111 Even so, every few years, efforts focus on women’s ability
to step up their own representation.112 This pressure to lean in falls
generally short.113 It presumes that women on their own can secure
109

See Mandated Board Diversity, supra note 19.
Public retirement funds are some of the largest investors in the United States, and
their support for stakeholders could prove central toward shifting corporate norms.
David Webber et al. claim that firms can and do institute greater equality within their
organizations, but many only change when the shareholders that elect their boards
insist on that change. Barzuza et al., supra note 12, at 1243.
111 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom:
The Inevitable Failure of California’s SB 826, at 8 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Stan.
L. Sch., Working Paper No. 232, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3248791 [https://perma.cc/S75B-SPJE].
112 Joe Coscarelli, Grammys President Faces Backlash After Saying Women Need to
‘Step Up’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/arts/
music/grammys-step-up-neil-portnow-backlash.html [https://perma.cc/2KH8-X82W];
see Sarah Coury, Jess Huang, Ankur Kumar, Sara Prince, Alexis Krivkovich & Lareina
Yee, Women in the Workplace 2020, MCKINSEY (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/women-in-theworkplace [https://perma.cc/TZ8D-7YR6].
113 Sheryl Sandberg’s manifesto, Lean In, urged women to engage in a concerted
social effort to bring other women up to diversify the corporate hierarchy. SHERYL
SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 11 (1st ed. 2013). This push
to get women to lean in promotes a notion of individualized autonomy to general social
change.
110
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more representation even though male elites have little incentive to
yield their droit de seigneur over corporate leadership.114
Yet, private efforts — whether those of shareholder activists or
motivated individuals — cannot on their own generate structural
transformation of this nature. This limitation exists both within firms
and more broadly.115 Voluntary measures come and go as new
controversies draw activist shareholder attention. Activists, whether
institutional shareholders or nongovernmental organizations, ebb and
flow in their influence. Leaning in is an excellent form of consciousnessraising among market actors, but for such efforts to take root, the state’s
norm-setting authority plays an essential role.
It is for that reason that we suggest the creation of a fiduciary duty to
diversify corporate boards. Institutional investors could require social
policies for investee companies, notably relating to gender equality.
This could take the form of a duty to seek the development and
implementation of diversity policies among investee companies by
requiring them to disclose diversity policies (and the degree of their
implementation) in their annual reports.116
II.

A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO DIVERSIFY AND PUSH FOR GENDER EQUALITY

The following section seeks to redefine the fiduciary duty to include
gender equality. We redefine it to emphasize the board’s responsibilities
to change the “old boys’ club” culture and support diversity and
organizational inclusion. We will first define the concept of fiduciary
duty in the context of diversity and gender equality, before offering a
comparative analysis of its usage in corporate law in both international
and national jurisdictions.

114 Id. at 8; see also Women in the Workplace, LEANIN, https://leanin.org/women-inthe-workplace-report-2020 (last visited July 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ZK8T-E7HY].
115 See KANTER, supra note 92, at 291.
116 See INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN GUIDANCE ON DIVERSITY ON BOARDS 14
(2016), https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGN%20Guidance%20on%20Diversity%
20on%20Boards%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U4E-382D]. With regards to voting,
institutional investors must further disclose their expectations on board diversity from
investee companies in their governance and proxy voting guidelines. They can do so by
disclosing their proxy voting guidelines to investee companies, particularly with regards to
how diversity factors may affect shareholder votes for board candidates. See id.
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A. Fiduciary Duty
Fiduciary relationships are crucial to any individual in any society.
That is because few individuals are self-sufficient, and fewer, if any,
can live alone.
—Tamar Frankel117
Fiduciary relationships have an important norm-setting role in many
legal fields118 and have a long history.119 The fiduciary duty is imposed
upon people or organizations in a position of trust or confidence to deal
with agency costs, asymmetric information, and conflict of interest
when they exercise “some discretionary power in the interests of
another person.”120

117

Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law, supra note 58.
See id. at 1-2. See generally EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF
HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY, chs. 1 & 7 (2016)
(discussing the fiduciary duty a sovereign may owe to a subject and the fiduciary duties
owe to refugees); Aditi Bagchi, Fiduciary Principles in Employment Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 187 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) (discussing fiduciary
duties of employees and employers); Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 23 (exploring fiduciary
duties in common law agency relationships); Nina A. Kohn, Fiduciary Principles in
Surrogate Decision-Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 249
(discussing fiduciary principles in a surrogate decision- making relationship); Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer, Fiduciary Principles in Charities and Other Nonprofits, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 103 (discussing the application of fiduciary
duties to charities and nonprofits); Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Principles in Pension Law,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 167 (discussing fiduciary duties
in pension law); Elizabeth S. Scott & Ben Chen, Fiduciary Principles in Family Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 227 (discussing the relationships
between family members as a fiduciary relationship); Emily L. Sherwin, Formal Elements
of Contract and Fiduciary Law, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 167 (Paul B.
Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016) (discussing the conflict between the rules of
contract law and the fluid nature of fiduciary duty); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a
Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploration Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319
(1999) (discussing fiduciary duty as a regulatory structure in the financial services
industry); Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of
Interest, 29 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 478 (2005) (discussing the idea of fiduciary duties in
the banking industry); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40
J. CORP. L. 647 (2015) (defending the fiduciary duty of care).
119 Frankel, supra note 117.
120 FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 11.
118
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What Role Does Fiduciary Duty Play Within Corporate Law?

According to traditional common law, there are limits on the
discretion of institutional investors’ decision-making powers.121
Currently, in the United States,122 the tendency is to follow the “all
things being equal rule,” which means that institutional investors can
invest assets in such a way as to “generate collateral benefits, but only
if such an investment was ‘equal to or superior’ in risk, return, and
soundness to other alternatives.”123 The Modern Portfolio Theory has
influenced fiduciary duty since the last decades of the 20th century and,
accordingly, directed institutional investors to act “rationally” in the
sole financial interest of the firm.124 At times, this creates incongruous
situations where institutional investors will not consider other factors,
such as the well-being of their investors or beneficiaries, or the ability
to allocate benefits impartially between current and future generations.
According to Lydenberg, this approach ignores the previous
interpretation of fiduciary duty that drew on a conception of prudence,
which was “characterized by wisdom, discretion and intelligence — one
that accounted to a greater degree for the relationship between one’s
investments and their effects on others in the world.”125 The main
question that stems from this Article is whether the United States will
change its approach to fiduciary duty in the near future.
121 Contra RORY SULLIVAN, WILL MARTINDALE, ELODIE FELLER, MARGARITA PIROVSKA &
REBECCA ELLIOT, FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT 11,
https://www.unepfi.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Fiduciary-duty-21stcentury-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3UY-FKDF] [hereinafter FIDUCIARY DUTY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT] (“In jurisdictions where civil law applies – Brazil,
China, the EU, France, Germany and Japan – any obligations equivalent to ‘fiduciary
duties’ will be set out in statutory provisions regulating the conduct of investment
decision makers and in the governmental and other guidelines that assist
in the interpretation of these provisions. The content of each of these statutory
provisions differs slightly between jurisdictions and depends on the type of institutional
investor . . . .”).
122 See id. (“In the US, for example, the decision maker’s duty is to exercise
reasonable care, skill and caution in pursuing an overall investment strategy that
incorporates risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.”).
123 Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto & Anne M. Tucker,
Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 85
(2015); see also Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging
Economically Targeted Investments, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 49 (1996) (“The
Department of Labor’s position under the direction of Lanoff became known as the ‘all
things being equal’ test.”).
124 Steve Lydenberg, Reason, Rationality, and Fiduciary Duty, 119 J. BUS. ETHICS 365,
365 (2014).
125 Id.
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Fiduciary Duty and the Purpose of the Corporation

There is an old debate over the purpose of the corporation and board
fiduciary duty. This is part of a 1930s Harvard Law Review debate
between two notable corporate law scholars — Adolfe A. Berle, Jr.126
and Merrick E. Dodd.127 The debate includes a dispute about the roles
and responsibilities of corporate managers and directors and continues
to this day.128
Is the main purpose of the company to increase its profits (financial
gains), and by doing so to increase the value of its shares (or bonds) to
the benefit of its members or shareholders, so to increase their financial
gains? Lynn Stout called for a radical change in the theory and
philosophy of current corporate governance theory.129 The short-term

126 See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (arguing in favor of profit as a corporation’s sole purpose).
127 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (arguing that a corporation has both profit-making and social
service purposes).
128 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993)
(addressing the debate over corporate responsibility set off by the growing prominence
of corporations and the increasing independent power of managers); Christopher M.
Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008)
(observing a debate in the contemporary corporate governance space); Barnali
Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate
Paradigm, 11 J. BUS. L. 631, 633 (2009) (discussing “the ambiguities of corporate law
by challenging corporate governance models that favor only one view of corporate
purpose, and by identifying the differing norms that corporate case law and statutes
impose”); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible
Shareholder”, 10 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 31, 40 (2005) (exploring the nexus between
shareholder ethical responsibility and corporate law); Roberta Romano, Less Is More:
Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18
YALE J. ON REGUL. 174, 174 (2001) (reviewing “corporate finance literature on
institutional investors’ activities in corporate governance and us[ing] the findings of the
empirical literature to inform normative recommendations for the proxy process”);
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1189, 1189 (2002) (“suggest[ing] that we have made at least some intellectual progress
over the intervening decades on the question of the proper role of the corporation”);
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lecture and Commentary, The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors
and Stockholders in Charge of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2002).
129 Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship — Creating Shared Value
Through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 520, 540 (2017);
Anat Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’, supra note 33, at 146.

ALON-BECK_AGMON-GONNEN_ROSENBLUM MACRO V3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

132

University of California, Davis

11/8/2021 11:16 AM

[Vol. 55:nnn

focus of investors and corporate boards continues to be a highly
contested issue in the corporate governance debate.130
Today, this debate continues with different prominent actors, which
are represented generally by Lucian Bebchuck131 on the one hand,
versus Martin Lipton132 and Ed Rock133 on the other. Rock is currently
the Reporter and working on introducing stakeholder elements into the
restatement, under the American Law Institute Council’s Restatement of
Corporate Law project.134 Rock’s undertaking is extremely important
due to the recent pressure on corporate boards and managers to take
stakeholder interests into account.135
The debate is relevant today because the pandemic highlights a new
movement in corporate law, which calls on companies and institutional
investors to adopt a new theory of the purpose of the corporation.136
Amongst the notable spokespeople of the movements are Martin Lipton,
Colin Mayer, and Alex Edmans.
Lipton calls on companies, asset managers, and investors to embrace
the principles of his new corporate governance framework, The New
Paradigm, which takes stakeholder interests into account to achieve

130 For discussion on shareholder value, see MAYER, supra note 57; see also Ira M.
Millstein, Re-examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 11,
2013), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/03/11/re-examining-board-priorities-inan-era-of-activism/ [https://perma.cc/HJM8-W58D](“[C]orporate boards around the
country should re-examine their priorities and figure out to whom they owe their
fiduciary duties . . . . Some activists are using their newfound power to sway and bully
management to focus on the short term, meet the quarterly targets and disgorge cash in
extra dividends or stock buy backs in lieu of investing in long-term growth.”).
131 See Lucien A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 91 (2020).
132 See Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum & Karessa L. Cain, Thoughts for Boards
of Directors in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020/
[https://perma.cc/8K98-42BV].
133 See Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, FAC.
SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN L., July 21, 2015, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2459&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/Y7RP5DK4] (discussing the roles of institutional investors in corporate governance).
134 Laying Down the Law: Edward Rock Will Oversee Drafting of the First ALI
Restatement on Corporate Governance, N.Y.U. L. (Apr. 5, 2019) https://www.law.nyu.
edu/news/ideas/edward-rock-ALI-corporate-governance-restatement [https://perma.cc/
7ZNQ-QX8Z].
135 Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’, supra note 33, at 147-48.
136 See id. at 148.
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long-term value and resist short-termism.137 Mayer is collaborating with
the British Academy’s Future of the Corporation Project, and who calls
for a more radical reform. In his recent book, Prosperity: Better Business
Makes the Greater Good, Mayer proposes a new theory of the purpose
of business: “[t]he purpose of business is to produce profitable solutions
to the problems of people and planet, and in the process it produces
profits.” 138 Edmans offers a new financial theory “pieconomics” in his
book Grow the Pie, which shows that “the most successful companies
don’t target profit directly but are driven by purpose — the desire to
serve a societal need and contribute to human betterment.”139
Other scholars are advocating for a “third way,” whereby the duty of
loyalty also runs to the corporate form as a separate entity. Leo Strine,
for example, calls for “bridging the conceptual divide” between the
shareholder and stakeholder theories.140 Whereas Asaf Raz141 suggests
that directors owe their duties neither to shareholders, nor to
stakeholders. Instead, their loyalty is to the corporation as a separate
legal person. When they act, directors have a duty to advance the
corporation’s purpose. That purpose, dictated by state corporate law
(such as Delaware’s Time decision142), is first to act lawfully: by
definition, the corporation is legally required to meet all of its
obligations to stakeholders. The corporation is then free to pursue its
own profit. The following re-examines the old question of shareholder
oversight over corporate boards, in the context of the nature of
institutional investors with their own corporate governance issues and
incentive structures.

137 Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-toadopt-the-new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/5556-6K9A].
138 MAYER, supra note 57, at 109; THE BRITISH ACADEMY, PRINCIPLES FOR PURPOSEFUL
BUSINESS 8, 16 (2019); THE BRITISH ACADEMY, REFORMING BUSINESSES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION 16 (2018).
139 EDMANS, supra note 57, at 1.
140 William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate:
A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2002);
see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect
Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective
Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 Iowa L. Rev. 1885, 1886 (2021).
141 Asaf Raz, A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law, 65 VILL. L. REV. 523, 529
(2020) https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3457&
context=vlr [https://perma.cc/9KFU-SGN8].
142 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989).
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Why Is Fiduciary Duty the Central Repository of the Link
Between Individuals and the Firm?

Institutional investors, and the financial institutions that they
represent, are known as fiduciaries. As such, institutional investors are
trusted with managing money (or other assets) on behalf of their
investors or beneficiaries. The relationship between the two is
asymmetrical.143 Investors or beneficiaries depend on institutional
investors because they “cannot acquire the knowledge and expertise
necessary for all the services that all fiduciaries can, and do, offer.”144 In
return, they reward fiduciaries for their services.
Institutional investors acquire power over their investors or
beneficiaries primarily because, more often than not, they have the
discretion to decide how to invest the funds they control.145 Investors
or beneficiaries generally cannot exercise oversight (monitoring) over
the institutional investor. 146 They might not possess the expertise
needed to be able to “fully evaluate and judge the value, quality and
reliability of services, and whether it satisfies their needs.”147 Fiduciary

143 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309
(1976) (“Since the relationship between the stockholders and manager of a corporation
fit the definition of a pure agency relationship it should be no surprise to discover that
the issues associated with the ‘separation of ownership and control’ in the modern
diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of
agency.”). For further discussion on agency problems and strategies to reduce them, see
also George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 493 (1970) (explaining what is considered an asymetric
relationship); John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems
and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29, 35-53 (Reinier H. Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
144 Frankel, supra note 117, at 3.
145 FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 10 (“In
practice, these fiduciaries have discretion as to how they invest the funds they control.
The scope of that discretion varies. It may be narrow, for example, in the case of tailored
mutual funds where the beneficiary specifies the asset profile and only the day-to-day
stock selection and other management tasks are left to the investment decision maker.
It may be wide, as with many occupational pension funds. Further, some public funds
are subject to considerable state control and the discretion afforded to these decision
makers may be further narrowed by parameters set by government.”).
146 Id. (“These duties are of particular importance in relationships where there is
vulnerability (e.g. . . . where the ability of the beneficiary to monitor or oversee the
actions of the person or entity acting in their interests is limited), power to act or
discretion. The manner in which these duties are framed differs between countries and
between common and civil law jurisdictions”).
147 Frankel, supra note 117, at 3.
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duties, therefore, are vital to curtail the institutional investor’s powers,
so that it is not “abused and misused, intentionally or negligently.”148
How does one become a fiduciary? In the corporate law context, a
person becomes a fiduciary by serving as a director or officer.149 To
whom do corporate fiduciary duties run? The answer can change
depending on the state or nation in question. According to Velasco, in
Delaware, “the answer is straightforward: it is ultimately to the
shareholders alone.”150 For other views on Delaware, see the Part above
on the Purpose of the Corporation and Fiduciary Duty. In other states
or nations, the fiduciary duty may be extended more broadly.151
It might be permissible to take equality factors into account when
investing under United States corporate fiduciary law and trust
fiduciary law if the jurisdiction in question also takes environmental,
social, and governmental (“ESG”) factors into account. For example,
Delaware recently changed its trust law to incorporate ESG.152
Additionally, according to Sitkoff et al., if the following two conditions
are satisfied, trustees can take ESG into account: (1) the trustee
reasonably concludes that taking such factors into account will benefit
the beneficiary directly by improving risk-adjusted return; and (2) the
trustee’s sole motive for taking the factors into account when investing
is to obtain this direct benefit.153 As discussed below, significant
progress could come from making it mandatory and not merely
permissible to take gender equality into account.
The following chart illustrates various fiduciary duty sources from
different jurisdictions and in specific contexts.

148

Id.
See Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 61 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff
eds., 2019). It should be noted that employees and other agents of the corporation are
also fiduciaries, but that is more properly understood as an aspect of agency law rather
than corporate law. See Bagchi, supra note 118; DeMott, supra note 118. In addition,
shareholders with a controlling interest in the corporation may be held to have fiduciary
duties.
150 See Velasco, supra note 149, at 64; Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: Searching for the Optimal Balance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 118; see e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9
(Del. 1998) (“The board of directors has the legal responsibility to manage the business
of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”).
151 See Velasco, supra note 149, at 64 (discussion on constituency statutes).
152 Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social
Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381,
387 (2020).
153 Id. at 390.
149
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Fiduciary duty and governance flow chart (Weng, 2011)
4.

Why Focus on the Fiduciary Duty to Strive for Gender
Equality?

This article focuses on fiduciary duties because there is an ongoing
debate as to whether fiduciaries (trustees) perceive the law as limiting
their discretion to consider other factors when making investment
decisions. Some even perceive fiduciary duties as barriers to the
adoption of ESG principles.154 This position seems to stem from a
misconception about the concept of the fiduciary duty.155
154

See id. at 433.
See FIDUCIARY DUTIES, supra note 11, at 5 (“[T]here remains a widespread
assumption that fiduciary duty only permits the consideration of ESG factors insofar as
they affect profits at an individual company level. This is at odds with the conclusion of
the Freshfields Report, and the dictates of modern portfolio theory, that investors’
155
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In most common law jurisdictions, fiduciary duty may limit the
discretion of the institutional investors as investment decision
makers.156 Investment decision makers have duties because they are in
a position of trust, confidence, and are required to act in the best interest
of their beneficiaries. As fiduciaries, investment decision makers have
to deal with agency costs, asymmetric information, and conflicts of
interest.157
Recently, there has been growing support for allowing trustees to
consider financially material ESG principles to further the best interests
of their beneficiaries. 158 The 2005 Freshfields Report is credited with
helping to build this support among legal scholars.159 Institutional
investors could thus be free to follow a wide range of diversified
investment strategies, as long as they are rational and economically
justifiable.160 Therefore, institutional investors would not be required to
maximize the return of individual investments; instead, the prudence of
any specific investments would be assessed holistically within the
context of their total investment strategy.161
However, the support for this position is not universal.162 Moreover,
we argue that the fiduciary duty (of loyalty) should be extended and
declared publicly by our policymakers to require that institutional
investors take equality factors into account. By building on the duty of
loyalty, any investment that incorporates equality can be perceived as
being motivated by the best interests of the fund’s beneficiaries. Such a
strategy can then be expected to impact the overall investment portfolio
positively. One way to extend fiduciary duty is to encompass the sole
interest rule under ERISA.163
fiduciary duties entail seeking good returns across their portfolios, rather than on a
stock by stock basis.”).
156 UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 8 (2005),
https://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields_legal_resp_20051123.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LCC-QQMG] [hereinafter THE FRESHFIELDS REPORT].
157 See FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 12.
158 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 152, at 422.
159 See THE FRESHFIELDS REPORT, supra note 156, at 8; see also Joakim Sandberg,
Socially Responsible Investment and Fiduciary Duty: Putting the Freshfields Report into
Perspective, 101 J. BUS. ETHICS 143, 144 (2010).
160 THE FRESHFIELDS REPORT, supra note 156, at 8.
161 Id.
162 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 152, at 390.
163 As noted above, the duty of loyalty, requires that institutional investors, as
fiduciaries, advance the best interests of their beneficiaries. Under U.S. trust fiduciary
law, the duty of loyalty prevents fiduciaries from acting for the betterment of their own
or third-party interests. It is referred to as a “sole interest rule.” See RESTATEMENT
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We recognize that this argument is novel and not the current law in
most United States jurisdictions. Therefore, we are advocating for the
law in the United States to change to allow for such an extension of
fiduciary duties.
5.

Fiduciary Duties, ESG, and Codifying Gender Equality

There is a global movement towards the acknowledgment that
fiduciary duties of institutional investors require incorporating ESG
norms.164 This Article recommends codifying this surfacing norm to
encourage universal attention to gender equality, diversity, and
inclusion. Currently, the discussion on legal and regulatory frameworks
within which institutional investors operate revolves around the
“consideration of how ESG issues affect the investment decision
. . . .”165 Institutional investors must perform a balancing act between

(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (AM. L. INST. 2007); see also UNIF. TR. CODE § 802(a) (UNIF.
L. COMM’N 2000); see, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1988) (noting
that the sole interest rule is the default in trust law but is mandatory under section
404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended (“ERISA”).).
The difference between ERISA and trust law is that ERISA codifies the sole interest
rule by making it mandatory. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 152, at 401.
According to the Supreme Court, this means that the pension trustee must act in a way
that will benefit the beneficiaries financially. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573
U.S. 409, 420-21 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)); Schanzenbach &
Sitkoff, supra note 152, at 404. This is where the United States and other jurisdictions
differ. Under U.S. law, if a pension trustee considers other interests or acts in a way that
will not necessarily benefit the beneficiaries financially, then she is breaching the duty
of loyalty. That is why it is important to differentiate between risk-return equality
factors and collateral benefits equality factors.
For reference, we can also build on the literature of ESG investing. According to
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff, if the fiduciary’s sole motive is to benefit the beneficiary, then
risk-return ESG can be consistent with the duty of loyalty under ERISA, even with the
Supreme Court’s strict “financial benefits” analysis. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note
152, at 406. The same analysis can be applied here. As long as the fiduciary’s sole motive
is to benefit the beneficiary, the fiduciary can be protected by the duty of loyalty when
engaging with companies and pushing for equality.
Until recently, the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) position on a pension trustee’s
ability to make decisions on risk-return (not collateral) ESG investing was largely in
agreement with the above analysis. Currently, the U.S. government wants pensions out
of ESG. Recently, the DOL announced a proposed rule that would limit the
consideration of ESG factors in investment decisions.
164 See FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 12.
165 Id. at 9.
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the boundaries of their fiduciary duties and attractive ESG principles.166
For example, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Principles for Responsible
Investment Initiative goes further, calling upon companies to focus on
how these decisions can affect ESG-related issues.167
Similarly, in some jurisdictions, the fiduciary duty is interpreted to
require institutional investors to incorporate ESG issues into their
overall investment analysis.168 Taking such factors into account is
viewed as a decision that contributes to the company’s financial growth
and overall long-term value creation.169
We suggest that institutional investors incorporate gender equality
factors into their investment analysis and decision-making processes.
This would be consistent with a long-term investment timeline. This
166 See MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, THE REGULATORY OVERLAY ON ESG INVESTING
2 (2020), http://documents.jdsupra.com/17320f46-4634-4952-b0c7-83f71474611f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z399-9EVV]; see also Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, “Modernizing” Regulation S-K: Ignoring the Elephant in the Room (Jan. 30,
2020); Allison Herren Lee & Caroline Crenshaw, Comm’rs, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Joint
Statement on the Failure to Modernize the Accredited Investor Definition (Aug. 26,
2020); Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Meeting of the
SEC Investor Advisory Committee (May 21, 2020).
167 About the PRI, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., https://www.unpri.org/pri/aboutthe-pri (last visited June 29, 2021) [https://perma.cc/PE7Q-BD69].
168 ESG refers to the environmental, social and governance factors. Tyler Payne,
Nathalie Sadler, Mikhaelle Schiappacasse & Carol Widger, Dechert on ESG, Diversity
and Inclusion in Asset Management, JDSUPRA (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/dechert-on-esg-diversity-and-inclusion-85053/ [https://perma.cc/A4DW-BFVM]
(“One significant ESG factor is diversity and inclusion (“D&I”) which is, of course, also
a broad topic in its own right. Indeed, a number of ESG texts focus on D&I, including
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (which cover both reducing
inequality in general and improving gender equality more specifically). D&I impacts
the asset management industry at a number of pressure points and managers should
expect it to arise with increasing frequency and in different guises. This is due to a longterm shift in culture (as demonstrated by the recent #MeToo campaign, for example),
coupled with factors such as more millennials (who have grown up versed in these
issues) moving into more senior, decision-making roles in the industry, both as
investors and managers. Key areas where the issue of D&I particularly impacts the asset
management industry include: (i) investor-level focus on the issue, (ii) D&I’s potential
impact on a fund’s downstream activities, and (iii) D&I’s impact on the ongoing
management of the manager’s business (including as relates to economic return, legal
obligations and human resource management).”).
169 See WITOLD HENISZ, TIM KOLLER & ROBIN NUTTALL, FIVE WAYS THAT ESG CREATES
VALUE 2 (2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/
strategy%20and%20corporate%20finance/our%20insights/five%20ways%20that%20esg%
20creates%20value/five-ways-that-esg-creates-value.pdf?shouldIndex=false [https://perma.
cc/WJ7U-4JM2]; Thibaut Millet, How ESG Creates Long Term Value, ERNST & YOUNG
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.ey.com/en_ca/climate-change-sustainability-services/
how-esg-creates-long-term-value [https://perma.cc/CQS4-QLSF].
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objective is achievable by codifying the duty to strive for gender equality
theorized in this paper. Furthermore, institutional investors could be
required to report on how they have implemented these gender equality
commitments. In this way, institutional investors that fail to implement
these measures also fail their fiduciary duties and could be subject to
legal action.170
We believe that this suggested extension is consistent with a director’s
fiduciary duties, as long as the decision positively contributes to the
financial growth and overall long-term value creation of the
company.171
Moreover, such a decision could be considered a business decision
and is thus likely protected under the business judgment rule
(“BJR”).172 The BJR is a common law defense developed by courts and
an important concept to understanding fiduciary duties in corporate
law.173 It is (and has been for decades) the most important protection
against personal liability for directors and officers. It allows directors

170 Cf. FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 10
(“The manner in which these duties are framed differs between countries and between
common and civil law jurisdictions. . . .”).
171 See generally HENISZ ET AL., supra note 169, at 3 (expanding on ESG’s five links to
value creation); Millet, supra note 169 (“ESG disclosures are becoming increasingly
valuable for investors as they look to drive value for the company.”).
172 See Joshua Fershée, On Corporate Purpose, Director Primacy, and the Business
Judgment Rule, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 4, 2020), https://clsbluesky.
law.columbia.edu/2020/12/04/on-corporate-purpose-director-primacy-and-the-businessjudgment-rule/ [https://perma.cc/S75B-G8F5]; David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, The
Broadening Basis for Business Judgment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept.
28, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/28/the-broadening-basis-for-businessjudgment/ [https://perma.cc/82K6-VLYD]; see also William T. Allen, Modern Corporate
Governance and the Erosion of the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law, 4
COMPAR. RSCH. L. & POL. ECON. 1, 17 (2008), https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=clpe [https://perma.cc/DHY6-QXAZ] (“The
human actors who pull the strings of the institutional investors and the governance
entrepreneurs are agents too. We have not thought enough about how the actual
incentives of those who act for these institutions may differ from the social interest in
long-term wealth creation.”).
173 “The two primary underpinnings of the BJR are: 1. Courts should not substitute
their inexperienced business decisions for the good-faith decisions of independent and
diligent business executives, who have a far greater ability to make appropriate business
decisions based on their extensive commercial knowledge, experience and training. 2.
Executives should be encouraged to take prudent risks for the benefit of the company
and its constituents, and should not be stymied by the fear of personal liability if a
decision ultimately harms the company.” DAN A. BAILEY, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
UNDER ATTACK 1, http://baileycav.com/site/assets/files/1455/the_business_judgment_
rule_under_attack.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRP9-W9VR].
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and officers in a corporation to take calculated business risks and
prevents the courts from second-guessing such business decisions.174
For comparative analysis, the following is a short survey on the
development of fiduciary duties around the world.
B. Comparative Analysis — Current Developments and the Global
Debate over Fiduciary Duties and the Purpose of the Corporation
The United States is not the only place where the scope of fiduciary
duty and the integration of ESG metrics is contested. Despite the vast
progress in ESG integration and responsible investment practices, there
currently are variations among countries on the fundamental legal
requirements and national priorities. The following is a survey of the
most prominent developments.
1.

United Nations

In 2006, the United Nations adopted six global principles for social
investment called “PRI” (principles for responsible investment).175
These principles promote the incorporation of ESG factors into
investment decision-making, have increased investor awareness of
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”), and have increased
involvement in applying these principles to companies in which they
invest.176 In January 2016, the United Nations Environment Program
Finance Initiative (“UNEP FI”) and the Generation Foundation
Financial Initiative launched a project to clarify investors’ obligations
and duties, their duty of trust in the context of ESG investments,
decision-making, and governance.177 The United Nations Report on
Social Investment Recommendations perceived ESG investments as an
obligation included in the institutional investors’ fiduciary duty.178
174 Velasco, supra note 149, at 64. Delaware courts interpret the BJR as “a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing
Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971)), overruled by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
175 Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Launches ‘Principles for
Responsible Investment’ Backed by World’s Largest Investors, U.N. Doc. SG/2111ECO/106 (Apr. 27, 2006) (on file with author).
176 See id.
177 Explanatory Notes, FIDUCIARY DUTY, https://www.fiduciaryduty21.org/explanatorynotes.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/63UU-QFSW].
178 “Based on in-depth assessment in eight countries (US, Canada, Germany, UK,
Japan, Australia, South Africa and Brazil), Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century concluded
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In their last report, published in October 2019, they concluded that
as part of the institutional investor’s fiduciary duty, they should
consider social investments and incorporate them into their investment
plan, encourage ESG activity in companies in which they invest, and
report on their goals and their progress in achieving them.179 The key
reasoning is that these investments have economic value — even more
so when considering long-term returns — and therefore ignoring these
considerations is detrimental to investors.180
2.

Israel

The Israeli Company Law, which was enacted in 1999, explicitly
addressed the issue of stakeholders.181 Under the section relating to the
purpose of the company, the law states that: “The purpose of a company
shall be to operate in accordance with business considerations in
realizing its profits, and within the scope of such considerations, the
interests of its creditors, its employees and the public; may inter alia be
taken into account[.]”182 This section, which defines the purpose of the
company, serves as its compass that directors and officers must follow.
Considering the interests of society or various communities while
generating profit is explicitly sanctioned by the legislation.
3.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is leading the charge on the redefinition of the
purpose of the corporation and the implementation of a stakeholder
corporation governance model. We will focus our attention on Section
172 of the Companies Act,183 along with the UK Corporate Governance
that ‘Failing to consider long-term investment value drivers, which include ESG issues,
. . . is a failure of fiduciary duty.’ It also acknowledged that despite significant progress,
many investors have yet to fully integrate ESG issues into their investment decisionmaking processes.” Id.
179 See FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 15.
180 See id. at 17; see, e.g., Fiona Reynolds, Retrograde Australian Proxy Advice Reforms
Impede the Rise of Global Stewardship, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (June 30,
2021), https://www.unpri.org [https://perma.cc/JBA2-AM7A] (“Institutional investors
echoed global outrage at the weak response from Rio Tinto following their destruction
of sacred Aboriginal caves . . . .”).
181 Israeli law is primarily based on a common law legal system. See Amir Licht
& Itai Fiegenbaum, Corporate Law of Israel, UNIV. OXFORD FAC. OF L. (Dec. 18,
2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/12/corporate-lawisrael [https://perma.cc/D5BK-3MLB].
182 § 11(a), Companies Law, 5759-1999, LSI 1711 189 (Isr.).
183 The law states (in section 172): “Duty to promote the success of the company
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Code, and new reporting requirements that are now connected with
these developments. The British Companies Act of 2006 adopted a
similar position to Israel: Officers must act in good faith to promote the
company’s success and the benefit of its shareholders while taking
stakeholder interests into account.184 Section 172 makes sure that
officers and directors must consider stakeholder interests.185 It remains
that if an officer or director does not advance the company’s purpose,
they have breached their legal obligations.186
Additionally, the new UK Stewardship Code identifies the primary
purpose of stewardship as looking after the assets of the beneficiaries.187
It also broadens the Code’s scope to include investment decisionmaking processes and adds investment in assets other than listed
equity.188 This new Code ensures that the professional activities and
standards of institutional investors and the overall operations of the
capital market will serve as a growth engine for the economy.

(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith,
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of
its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters)
to—
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests
of the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the company’s business
relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the
company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the
desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of
business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the
company.
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or
include purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has
effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for the
benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes.” Companies Act
2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.).
184 See id.; FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 4 (2020),
https://www.wlrk.com/docs/TheUKStewardshipCode2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW7V-BKBY].
185 See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.).
186 See id. § 178.
187 “Stewardship is the responsible allocation, management, and oversight of capital
to create long-term value for clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable benefits for
the economy, the environment and society.” FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 184.
188 See id.
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Canada

In Canada, the duty of loyalty is owed to the corporate entity itself
rather than to its shareholders. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada
ruled that when the law provides that the board must act in the best
interests of the company, the board may take into account additional
communities or constituencies.189 The Court explicitly cited
shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors and consumers, as well as
the government and the environment as factors that could be
considered within the best interests of the company.190 The Supreme
Court of Canada reiterated this ruling in 2008 in the case of BCE Inc. v.
1976 Debentureholders, where it was expressly held that acting in favor
of the company means the company is “viewed as a good corporate
citizen.” 191 Therefore, according to this decision, when the board
considers the best interests of the corporation, the board may consider
the interests of shareholders and stakeholders that will be affected by
the decision.192
5.

USA

In 2018, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued a bulletin
regarding pension funds with much stricter rules than the above
examples.193 According to these trust rules, if an investment can cause
a plan to forego other investment opportunities, then plan fiduciaries
are not permitted to sacrifice investment return or take on additional
investment risk as a means of using plan investments to promote
collateral social policy objectives.194 But the DOL also stated that when
competing investments serve the plan’s overall economic interests
189

Peoples Dep’t Stores Inc. v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 482 (Can.).
Id.
191 BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 593 (Can.).
192 Following the decision, there were amendments to the CBCA, which were
intended to codify certain elements of that interpretation.
193 See DEP’T. OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 2018-01 - SUPERSEDED BY 85
FR 72846 AND 85 FR 81658, at 1 (2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employersand-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 [https://perma.cc/2M6A-2C5M];
Stephen Miller, DOL Affirms Fiduciary Standards for ‘Socially Responsible’ Funds, SHRM
(May 7, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/dolaffirms-fiduciary-standards-for-esg-funds.aspx [https://perma.cc/3WZG-7LUK].
194 See Anat Alon-Beck, Department of Labor, Fiduciary Duty and the Future of
Environmental, Social & Corporate Governance, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/09/14/department-of-labor-fiduciary-duty-and-thefuture-of-environmental-social—corporate-governance/?sh=687a1f2d4beb [https://perma.
cc/XY4C-H48W].
190
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equally, then plan fiduciaries can use such collateral considerations as
tiebreakers for an investment choice.195 On June 23, 2020, the DOL
announced a new proposed rule intended to provide a clear regulatory
guide for plan fiduciaries in light of new trends in ESG investing.196
According to the new proposal, it is clear that ERISA plan fiduciaries
may not invest in ESG vehicles if their investment strategies subordinate
returns or increase risk.197
In parallel, some jurisdictions, such as Delaware, the law has recently
evolved to allow fiduciaries to consider collateral interests of the

195 Nevin Adams, DOL Pulls Back on ESG Guidance, AM. SOC’Y PENSION PROS. &
ACTUARIES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.asppa.org/news/browse-topics/dol-pulls-backesg-guidance [https://perma.cc/YT5D-X6YC].
196 News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Proposes New
Investment Duties Rule (June 23, 2020) (on file with author),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200623 [https://perma.cc/AP2UPNS7].
197 Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia stated, “Private employer-sponsored retirement
plans are not vehicles for furthering social goals or policy objectives that are not in the
financial interest of the plan.” Id.
“The proposal would make five core additions to the regulation:
•
New regulatory text to codify the Department’s longstanding position that ERISA
requires plan fiduciaries to select investments and investment courses of action
based on financial considerations relevant to the risk-adjusted economic value of a
particular investment or investment course of action.
•
An express regulatory provision stating that compliance with the exclusivepurpose (i.e., loyalty) duty in ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) prohibits fiduciaries
from subordinating the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries in retirement
income and financial benefits under the plan to non-pecuniary goals.
•
A new provision that requires fiduciaries to consider other available investments
to meet their prudence and loyalty duties under ERISA.
•
The proposal acknowledges that ESG factors can be pecuniary factors, but only if
they present economic risks or opportunities that qualified investment
professionals would treat as material economic considerations under generally
accepted investment theories. The proposal adds new regulatory text on required
investment analysis and documentation requirements in the rare circumstances
when fiduciaries are choosing among truly economically “indistinguishable”
investments.
•
A new provision on selecting designated investment alternatives for 401(k)-type
plans. The proposal reiterates the Department’s view that the prudence and loyalty
standards set forth in ERISA apply to a fiduciary’s selection of an investment
alternative to be offered to plan participants and beneficiaries in an individual
account plan (commonly referred to as a 401(k)-type plan). The proposal describes
the requirements for selecting investment alternatives for such plans that purport
to pursue one or more environmental, social, and corporate governance-oriented
objectives in their investment mandates or that include such parameters in the fund
name.” Id.
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beneficiaries, such as employment status. With regards to Delaware, in
2018 its legislature amended its trust code to provide:
[W]hen considering the needs of the beneficiaries, the fiduciary
may take into account the financial needs of the beneficiaries as
well as the beneficiaries’ personal values, including the
beneficiaries’ desire to engage in sustainable investing strategies
that align with the beneficiaries’ social, environmental,
governance or other values or beliefs of the beneficiaries.198
The Delaware amendment departs from established trust fiduciary
law. Under traditional trust law, a beneficiary may waive its rights and
specifically authorize conduct by a trustee that would otherwise
constitute a breach of trust (by means of ratification, advance consent,
or subsequent release).199 Delaware courts will be required to resolve
several issues of legal uncertainty: What about the specific terms and
purpose of the trust as prescribed by the settlor? What if there is
disagreement on values and purpose between the various beneficiaries?
What is the effect of a beneficiary release?200
These discussions are not limited to states, nations, regulators and
policymakers. Recently, in the United States, there are voices on these
developments from the business community itself, as evidenced by the
Business Roundtable Statement.201 Leading American businessmen are
responding to public pressures to take ESG into account and investor
demands for change by broadening the purpose of the corporation. The
CEOs of Amazon, Apple, UPS, Wal-Mart, and nearly 200 of the world’s
largest companies recently agreed that in order to promote a thriving
economy, businesses require a long-term strategy for success.202 This
statement may reflect a shift from shareholder primacy to a
commitment to all stakeholders. Perhaps today’s business leaders have

198

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(a) (2019).
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 152, at 418.
200 See id. at 420.
201 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy
BUS.
ROUNDTABLE
(Aug.
19,
2019),
That
Serves
All
Americans’,
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-ofa-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/US62YFNR].
202 See David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer
Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/55XSYE7L].
199
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figured out that putting aside stakeholder interests is bad for
business.203
a.

Conclusions

Despite the disagreement and growing political tension over ESG
integration, one thing remains largely undisputed: the company’s
primary purpose is to maximize profits. However, a strict focus on
short-term profits may no longer be sufficient. The current prevailing
worldview sees the company as a citizen whose operations must
positively contribute to its community and society at large.
Therefore, we emphasize the centrality of corporate purpose in how
we understand the duties of directors and officers of the company in
general, and of institutional investors in particular. As a result,
executives must consider corporate governance as well as socioenvironmental considerations in their deliberations. As noted above, we
view institutional investors as “universal owners”;204 thus, their longterm maximization is not limited to increasing returns on a firm by firm
basis, but also to productivity in the economy as a whole.
Institutional investors are stewards. The stewardship principles
reflect a commitment from asset managers and institutional investors to
be accountable to the beneficial owners whose money they invest, and
to use their power as shareholders to foster sustainable, long-term value
creation. In embracing stewardship principles, asset managers and
investors should develop an understanding of a company’s governance,
its long-term business strategy, and pursue constructive dialogue as the
primary means for addressing suboptimal strategies or operations.
The following is our proposal.

203 Alon-Beck, supra note 33, at 120-21; see also Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 131,
at 94-95.
204 The concept of “universal ownership” was pioneered by James Hawley and
Andrew Williams, who argue that such owners should engage with the implications of
their decisions on their portfolios as a whole, and that they have an interest in the
stability and sustainability of the financial system as a whole. However, in practice, these
days most institutional investors do not perceive fiduciary duty to allow this or act this
way. Specifically, they do not seek good returns across their entire portfolios, but rather
still focus on a stock by stock analysis. This must change. FIDUCIARY DUTIES, supra note
11, at 5 (“[T]here remains a widespread assumption that fiduciary duty only permits
the consideration of ESG factors insofar as they affect profits at an individual company
level. This is at odds with the conclusion of the Freshfields Report, and the dictates of
modern portfolio theory, that investors’ fiduciary duties entail seeking good returns
across their portfolios, rather than on a stock by stock basis.”).
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III. A PROPOSAL TO PROMOTE BOARD GENDER EQUALITY
Our suggestion is that institutional investors, as stewards, should
actively seek to promote gender equality on the board. It should not
simply be a voluntary action on their part, but rather a duty embedded
within corporate law.
Institutional investors should push for gender equality and diversity
in the boardroom, and, ideally, support their public statements with
actions in two distinct ways. First, they could lead by example and take
steps to ensure that their boardrooms are diverse. Second, they could
privately engage in a year-round dialog with investee companies. If they
cannot persuade investee companies to change voluntarily, they could
turn to public avenues. These more radical strategies could include
putting pressure on the portfolio investee companies. For example, they
could do so by issuing guidance, using proxy voting against individual
directors, or filing shareholder proposals.
Institutional investors influence the actions of their portfolio investee
companies. They should look holistically at their board composition
and processes, and consider whether they are implementing new
policies to foster gender equality and, more generally, diverse and
inclusive cultures. The institutional investor could be in breach of its
fiduciary duties, including their duty of oversight, if they fail to
recognize and address the problem of “old boys’ club” culture at their
portfolio investee companies.205
To help institutional investors achieve these goals, we propose two
main practical ways to remove the current barriers concerning the
selection processes, investment analysis, and due diligence. First,
pertaining to the search committees and selection processes, we suggest
that companies adopt several new policies.206 Second, concerning the
lack of data on diversity, we propose creating an obligation to report on
boards’ diversity composition in proxy statements.
The following proposals may help set clear goals for institutional
investors, primarily when deciding on their investment policy, as well
as in their investee companies.

205 We focus on the concept of gender equality, which includes all the different forms
of gendered life and inequality in our analysis. We recognize that there is
intersectionality between gender, class, sexuality, race, and ethnicity, which affects a
human’s gendered experience. However, these distinctions and the differences between
the different forms of gendered life and inequality are beyond the scope of this Article.
206 See infra Parts III.A.1–2.
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A. Institutional Investors’ Duty to Consider Gender Representation on
Boards
1.

Main Principles

In light of the board of directors’ duties, the current regulatory
framework, and shifts in institutional investors’ market and legal
powers, we suggest that institutional investors might have a fiduciary
duty to consider issues of gender equality and representation in the
boardrooms of the corporations in which they invest.
Institutional investors could publicly commit to implement gender
equality and diversity policies for their current and future investments,
including explanations of how these commitments align with fiduciary
duties. They can hold investee companies accountable for making
progress on gender equality policies. Institutional investors could seek
the development and implementation of gender equality policies among
investee companies by calling on investee companies to disclose gender
equality policies and their implementation in their annual reports.
Those policies would specifically include identity-based diversity
factors such as gender (or race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or
disability).
When it comes to voting, institutional investors should perhaps
disclose their expectations on board diversity, including identity-based
diversity factors, such as gender, from investee companies in their
governance and proxy voting guidelines. They could disclose their
proxy voting guidelines to investee companies, particularly with regard
to how gender equality factors may affect shareholder votes for board
candidates.
They could also consider how they vote on board director
appointments, and adopt a clear process to achieve this goal, such as the
one suggested below. They should provide robust, credible, and detailed
accounts to their beneficiaries or investors on the implementation of
diversity measures as well as their efficacy.
To bring about equal opportunities, they should proactively reach out
to women from existing or purposefully prepared pools. Women who
want to be directors should be included in lists made for this purpose.
They could set an allocation procedure that will end with the same
number of men and women candidates to each position on the board.
Finally, when there are equal numbers of women and men candidates,
there could be affirmative action on an individual basis. That is, if a
woman and a man have the same abilities, the woman should be
preferred, until sex equality is achieved.
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Process

We believe that process is critical. There are currently initiatives by
large corporations to adopt a process that is akin to the Rooney Rule,
first adopted by the National Football League (“NFL”).207 It mandates
that an NFL team must interview at least one minority candidate for
head coach or manager positions.208
However, the rule has two serious flaws: one, the temptation to
substitute sham interviews in place of a search for real diversity, and
two, important positions such as coordinator-level positions, a crucial
step to head-coaching jobs, are not under the umbrella.
The NFL did recently expand the rule to include women: “For all
executive openings in the commissioner’s office, a woman must be
interviewed.”209 The San Francisco 49ers were the first team to formally
adopt the practice, but the Rooney Rule’s flaws — like including token
interviewees — still plague this attempt at including women.210
Despite these flaws, the league did provide a blueprint for corporate
America to improve its poor hiring record with respect to diversity and
gender equality. Facebook, Pinterest, Intel, Xerox, and Amazon are
among the major companies that have instituted their own version of

207 See, e.g., Jason Del Rey, Amazon Will Adopt a “Rooney Rule’ to Increase Board
Diversity After Its Initial Opposition Sparked Employee Outrage, VOX (May 14, 2018, 4:49
PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/14/17353626/amazon-rooney-rule-boarddiversity-reversal-shareholder-proposal [https://perma.cc/3JZF-3ADF] (“Amazon said
. . . it would adopt a policy whereby women and people of color are included in the pool
of candidates for all board openings. . . .”).
208 Press Release, Nat’l Football League, NFL Expands Rooney Rule Requirements to
Strengthen Diversity (Dec. 12, 2018), https://nflcommunications.com/Pages/NFLEXPANDS-ROONEY-RULE-REQUIREMENTS-TO-STRENGTHEN-DIVERSITY.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4SR5-QMB3].
209 Jason Reid, NFL Effectively Shows It Will No Longer Enforce Rooney Rule, THE
UNDEFEATED (Jan. 22, 2018), https://theundefeated.com/features/nfl-shows-it-will-nolonger-enforce-rooney-rule/ [https://perma.cc/S7XH-627H]; see also Brakkton Booker,
NFL Announces New Rules to Tackle Lack of Diversity in Its Coaching, Executive Ranks,
NPR (May 19, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/19/858702029/nfl-announces-newrules-to-tackle-lack-of-diversity-in-its-coaching-executive-ra [https://perma.cc/M3A44K44].
210 See Jane McManus, San Francisco 49ers Adopt Rooney Rule for Women in BusinessSide Positions, ESPN (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/story/_/id/
15385274/san-francisco-49ers-adopt-rooney-rule-women-business-jobs [https://perma.cc/
2GEP-PG9M].
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the rule.211 Even the Pentagon has explored using some form of the rule
to diversify its officer corps.212
Due to these flaws, we suggest a change to the rule — companies
should add more than one woman to their pool of candidates and
nominees. According to research by Johnson, Hekman, and Chan, when
there is only one woman in the candidate pool, there is statistically no
chance of her being hired.213 However, this statistical result changes
dramatically if there is more than one woman in the candidate pool.214
Unfortunately, each additional woman that is added to the pool does
not automatically increase the probability of hiring a woman.215
Johnson, Hekman, and Chan found that having an equal number of men
and women candidates makes a significant difference rather than just
token interviewees.216 Therefore, we propose that board members
should be elected from an approximately equal number of men and
women candidates.
B. Requiring Policymakers and Regulators to Take Action
Policymakers and regulators could publicly declare that institutional
investors have a fiduciary duty to account for gender equality in their
investment processes, active ownership activities, and public policy
engagement.
211 Charlotte Carroll, What Is the Rooney Rule? Explaining the NFL’s Diversity Policy
for Hiring Coaches, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.si.com/nfl/2018/
12/31/rooney-rule-explained-nfl-diversity-policy [https://perma.cc/53GL-G2KH]; Del
Rey, supra note 207; Richard Feloni, Facebook Is Using the Same Approach the NFL Took
to Increase Diversity in the League, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2016, 7:35 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-is-using-the-rooney-rule-to-increase-diversity2016-1 [https://perma.cc/E5E6-ZGEF]; Emily Peck, Intel Now Hiring Way More Women
and You Can, Too!, HUFFPOST (Aug. 13, 2015, 11:14 AM EDT), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/intel-hiring-more-women-minorities_n_55cca7f5e4b0cacb8d3311fb [https://perma.
cc/JE9T-8ZBX]; Erin Spencer, You’ll Want to Pin This, Learnings from Pinterest’s Diversity
Successes, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018, 9:42 AM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
erinspencer1/2018/09/11/transparency-at-pinterest-is-leading-to-a-more-diverse-team/
?sh=5768e153ee89 [https://perma.cc/K6LS-R56U]. See generally JAIME B. HANSEN,
EXPANDING THE CONVERSATION (2017).
212 Tom Vanden Brook, Pentagon Proposal on ‘Rooney Rule’ for Minority Officers
Raising Internal Concerns, USA TODAY (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/2016/04/13/pentagon-proposal-rooney-rule-minority-officer-internalconcerns/82953928/?siteID=je6NUbpObpQ-Vyidn96wl.PGDxCWjyhHSA [https://perma.
cc/5G56-KP82].
213 Johnson et al., supra note 66.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
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Institutional investors could require their investee companies to
disclose information on the following: workforce composition
(including workforce demographics on hiring, promotion,
compensation, layoffs, furloughs, employment policies and practices)
broken down by major job categories; workforce compensation; with
regards to layoffs and furloughs, additional disclosures on
demographics of employees, such as rehires, training, healthcare and
other benefits; and best practices to ensure employee health and wellbeing during the pandemic.
Policymakers and regulators could clarify the following. First, that
institutional investors have a duty to seek the development and
implementation of diversity policies among investee companies. They
would do so by calling investee companies to disclose diversity policies,
which specifically include identity-based diversity factors, and the
degree of implementation in their annual reports.
Second, that institutional investors must disclose their expectations
on board diversity, including identity-based diversity factors, from
investee companies in their governance and proxy voting guidelines.
Third, that they must further provide robust, credible, and detailed
accounts on how these equality commitments have been implemented
and the outcomes that have resulted from such implementations.
Lack of representation for women at the board level directly affects
the rights and bargaining power of the workforce. For example, there
are many calls from civil rights activists and other actors to improve the
representation of women and minorities in public corporations on the
board level and to improve their workplace conditions and
environments to be more inclusive and equitable.217

217 See, e.g., Lee, Diversity Matters, supra note 23 (calling on the SEC to do more
regarding diversity and inclusion); June D. Bell, Corporate Board Diversity: Moving
Beyond Lip Service, SHRM (Jan. 16, 2021), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/allthings-work/pages/boosting-corporate-board-diversity.aspx [https://perma.cc/N3AKAZUD] (discussing calls to diversify corporate leadership); Michael Hatcher, Weldon
Lathan & Jackson Lewis, States Are Leading the Charge to Corporate Boards: Diversify!,
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 12, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2020/05/12/states-are-leading-the-charge-to-corporate-boards-diversify/ [https://perma.
cc/Q3TF-X333] (commenting on how states are leading efforts to impose board
diversity requirements); Jared Landaw & Barington Capital, Maximizing the Benefits of
Board Diversity: Lessons Learned from Activist Investing, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 14, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/14/maximizingthe-benefits-of-board-diversity-lessons-learned-from-activist-investing/ [https://perma.
cc/D5LR-GC3Y] (commenting on why board diversity matters to activist investors);
Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards: More Room to Grow, DELOITTE (Mar. 12,
2019), https://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2019/03/12/women-and-minorities-
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Employees, especially women and minority groups, are
disadvantaged because they do not have proper representation on the
board or access to information on their employers’ “workforce
demographics and on hiring, promotion, compensation, and
employment policies and practices.”218
As postulated by Jamillah Williams, employers deliberately conceal
information on employment practices and workforce demographics.219
They do so by using a strategy of “diversity as a trade secret” in order to
block access to this sort of data and control the outcome of lawsuits by
diversity advocates.220
Proprietary, confidential, or privileged information, such as trade
secrets, is extremely important to companies, large and small, public
and private, to prevent competitive harm to the business. However, the
fact that companies use “trade secret” strategy as a shield to prevent the
public and their employees from getting information on their diversity
policies and practices seems inappropriate.221
Public companies could be mandated to disclose diversity
information on recruitment, hiring, retention, and firing to the public.
Directors could require this information and make it available. More
information would allow institutional investors to monitor the
management and better evaluate whether the CEO and management
team are practicing purpose-driven leadership and stakeholder
capitalism.222

on-fortune-500-boards-more-room-to-grow/ [https://perma.cc/VFV5-QQ9T] (calling
for continued efforts to create more diverse corporate boards).
218 Williams, supra note 39, at 1687.
219 Id.; see also JENNY R. YANG & JANE LIU, ECON. POL’Y INST., STRENGTHENING
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR DISCRIMINATION: CONFRONTING FUNDAMENTAL POWER IMBALANCES
IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 10-15 (2021), https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/
publications/strengthening-accountability-for-discrimination-confronting-fundamentalpower-imbalances-in-the-employment-relationship/ [https://perma.cc/SPR4-PVML].
220 Williams supra note 39, at 1687 (“For example, Microsoft used the argument in
Moussouris v. Microsoft, an ongoing sex discrimination lawsuit filed in 2015, to prevent
public disclosure of Microsoft’s internal diversity data. More recently, IBM brought suit
in 2018 against its former Chief Diversity Officer to prevent her from taking a similar
job at Microsoft.”).
221 According to Williams, tech companies use “Exemption 4 of the Freedom of
Information Act, which covers ‘trade secrets’ and ‘commercial information,’ to prevent
exposure of diversity data collected by the government.” See id. at 1688.
222 Cf. The COVID-19 Corporate Response Tracker: How America’s Largest Employers
Are Treating Stakeholders Amid the Coronavirus Crisis, JUSTCAPITAL,
https://justcapital.com/reports/the-covid-19-corporate-response-tracker-how-americaslargest-employers-are-treating-stakeholders-amid-the-coronavirus-crisis/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/WQY2-78HD] (explaining how tracking such
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We recognize that the U.S. Congress could amend the securities laws
to require disclosure of diversity workforce information on hiring,
promotion, compensation, firing, and other employment policies and
practices. It can empower the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) to promote gender equality, diversity and inclusion in the
workforce, notably by adopting policies to ensure employee health and
well-being during the current Covid pandemic.
Institutional investors can promote such initiatives in the workforce
by taking meaningful steps to advance diversity and inclusion. They can
play a central role in developing uniform and agreed-upon standards to
assess the diversity policies and practices of the entities they invest in.
If disclosure is made mandatory, portfolio investee companies will
comply. It should be noted that this will not add significant additional
costs for public companies because most of this data is already collected
by large companies and is already required by other agencies, but is not
made public.223
Now, more than ever, directors could step up, make sure that their
interests are represented in governance decisions, and integrate culture
and “human capital considerations into the overarching strategy to
create long-term value.”224 Large public companies are repeat players in
competitive markets, where there is a shortage in skilled labor that
contributes to a “war for talent.”225 Employees contribute their sweat
information can allow institutional investors to monitor the management and better
evaluate corporate decisions).
223 Unfortunately, rather than mandating regulated entities (such as financial service
firms) disclose efforts to increase workplace diversity, the SEC has allowed voluntary
disclosures on such efforts. See Luis A. Aguilar, Failing to Advance Diversity and
Inclusion, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 11, 2015), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2015/06/11/failing-to-advance-diversity-and-inclusion/ [https://perma.
cc/G6PP-YASC]. Voluntary disclosure is ineffective and as a result, “[t]he Securities and
Exchange Commission [has] failed to take meaningful steps to advance diversity and
inclusion in the financial services industry, as required by Section 342 of the DoddFrank Act.” See id.
224 Stephen Klemash, Jennifer Lee & Jamie Smith, Human Capital: Key Findings from
a Survey of Public Company Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 24,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/24/human-capital-key-findings-froma-survey-of-public-company-directors/ [https://perma.cc/W5ZK-CVHF]; see also Anat
Alon-Beck, Stakeholder Capitalism: Should Employees Demand Change?, FORBES (June 11,
2020, 7:50 AM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/06/11/
stakeholder-capitalism-should-employees-demand-change/#69b05f193b7d [https://perma.
cc/MDE7-E6PV].
225 See, e.g., Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options — Golden Goose or Trojan Horse,
2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107, 114-15 (2019) (exploring “how U.S. technology
companies engage in a ‘war for talent’”); Anat Alon-Beck, Insight: When Unicorn
Employees Revolt and Push for IPO, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2019, 1:01 AM),
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equity “human capital” in order to benefit from the gains of their firm’s
success. Companies that cannot provide their workers with equal
opportunities regardless of their gender will not be able to continue to
attract or retain the talent that will help them grow and compete.
C. Requiring Intermediaries to Take Action
Intermediaries, such as legal advisors, investment consultants
(actuaries), stock exchanges, brokers, and data providers could also
make an effort to engage with their clients (through advising, training,
or integrating professional ethics codes) and other market participants
to integrate gender diversity practices into conventional financial
practices. They can achieve that goal by publicly expressing their views
to their clients. They can educate their clients and demand that they
commit to implementation of identity-based diversity factors and
policies, including explanations of how these commitments align with
fiduciary duties.
The following further explains why we decided to focus on
representation in the boardroom.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: GREAT POWER CARRIES GREAT
RESPONSIBILITY
A. Power in the Corporate World
Institutional investors’ influence on corporate governance is hard to
overstate, as they are “universal owners.”226 The financial world has
recently observed a rise in the number of assets that are controlled and
managed by these players.227 This gives them extraordinary powers. In

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/insight-when-unicorn-employeesrevolt-and-push-for-ipo [https://perma.cc/NYV2-Z52N] (explaining why “unicorn
firms have a high turnover rate and experience difficulties with attracting, engaging and
retaining talent”); Anat Alon-Beck, The Unicorn War for Talent: The Employees Fire Back.
WeWork Is the Latest Example, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2020, 12:12 PM EST),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/01/29/the-unicorn-war-for-talent-theemployees-fire-back-wework-is-the-latest-example/#1f178def35da [https://perma.cc/
6FTZ-SDXC] (discussing how the “war for talent” has led to a lawsuit).
226 FIDUCIARY DUTIES, supra note 11, at 5.
227 Francesco Franzoni, The Effects of Concentration in the Asset Management Industry
on Stock Prices, PROMARKET (June 7, 2019), https://promarket.org/2019/06/07/the-effectsof-concentration-in-the-asset-management-industry-on-stock-prices/ [https://perma.cc/
4KA9-R5F]; Julie Segal, The Asset Management Industry Is Getting More Concentrated,
INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/
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the past seventy years, institutional investors have increased their
market dominance and overall influence over the public equity markets
thanks to their extensive investments.228 To illustrate, note that in the
United States, the proportion of “public equities managed by
institutions has risen steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or
8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67% in 2010.”229 In 2016,
they held about 63% of the outstanding public corporate equity.230
In the United States and United Kingdom, institutional investors
gained such dominance thanks to an increase in the number of
households that participate in the capital markets through pooledinvestment vehicles (such as mutual funds and exchange-traded funds),
rather than direct investments.231 Bebchuk et al. further explain that the
rise of institutional investors was driven “by investor recognition of the

b1bk8n82qcc0kt/The-Asset-Management-Industry-Is-Getting-More-Concentrated
[https://perma.cc/L2HQ-66M3].
228 They hold a significant portion of shares and bonds in public companies. See BEN
W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM
OR PART OF THE SOLUTION?: KEY DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT
SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE IN U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKETS 1 (2011), https://web.law.
columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/millstein-center/80235_CED_WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/932Y-YU92]; Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate
Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors:
A Global Perspective, J. OF APPLIED FIN., Fall/Winter 2003, https://www.fma.org/
assets/docs/JAF/2003/jaf2003_13_2_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3T6-V6MC]; Luis A.
Aguilar, Comm’r., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at Georgia State Univ.,
Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility (Apr. 19, 2013) (transcript available
at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch041913laahtm [https://perma.cc/77WRS5UU]).
229 Aguilar, supra note 228; see also MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE 2010
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO
COMPOSITION 4 (2010); Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors
and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4 (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~keim/research/Changing
InstitutionPreferences_21Aug2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/L56W-PRXX]).
230 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 89, 91 (2017) (referencing 2016 data
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
231 See Aguilar, supra note 228 (“The growth in the proportion of assets managed by
institutional investors has been accompanied by a dramatic growth in the market
capitalization of U.S. listed companies. For example, in 1950, the combined market
value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was about $94 billion.
By 2012, however, the domestic market capitalization of the NYSE was more than $14
trillion, an increase of nearly 1,500%. This growth is even more impressive if you add
the $4.5 trillion in market capitalization on the NASDAQ market, which did not exist
until 1971. The bottom line is, that as a whole, institutional investors own a larger share
of a larger market.”).
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value of low-cost diversification and encouraged by favorable regulatory
and tax treatment.”232
As noted, there are different forms, governance structures, and
investment strategies of institutional investors.233 Depending on the
form, institutional investors are typically subject to distinct legal and
regulatory requirements, where some forms are regulated while others
are not.234 For the purposes of this Article, institutional investors are
those that invest most of the general public’s funds, including savings,
pensions, and insurance.
B. Institutional Investors Play an Important Role in Activism
As similarly stated by Churchill, but perhaps more recently by
Spiderman’s Uncle Ben: “with great power comes great
responsibility.”235 The investment policies and decisions made by
institutional investors have a considerable impact on corporate
governance, firm performance, and the companies’ overall behavior in
our market.236 It could be argued that the most successful companies do
not target profit directly but are driven by purpose — the desire to serve
a societal need and contribute to human betterment. Their long-term
maximization is not limited to an increase in returns but rather by a
contribution to a more productive economy. Responsibility, therefore,
232

Bebchuk et al., supra note 230.
See generally Rock, supra note 133 (discussing the roles of institutional investors
in corporate governance).
234 Id.
235 With
Great Power Comes Great Responsibility, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/07/23/great-power/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/Z4JP-8A7Q] (“Voltaire? Spider-Man? Winston Churchill? Theodore
Roosevelt? Franklin D. Roosevelt? Lord Melbourne? John Cumming? Hercules G. R.
Robinson? Henry W. Haynes?”).
236 See e.g., Barzuza et al., supra note 12, at 1244 (arguing that the “threedimensional millennial effect- as investors, customers, and employees . . . [can] provide
a counterweight to the wealth-maximization paradigm of corporate governance”);
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 12, at 2029-30 (discussing how the decisions of index fund
managers have “profund impact[s] on the governance and performance of public
companies and the economy”); Fisch et al., supra note 12, at 17 (noting that passive
investors “are the most important development in modern-day capital markets,
dictating trillions of dollars in capital flows and increasingly owning much of corporate
America”); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 12, at 864 (positing that “shareholder activists
should be seen as playing a specialized capital market role of setting up intervention
proposals for resolution by institutional investors”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at
1772 (noting that “[b]ecause high profile contests between activist shareholders and
boards often have a significant effect on firm value, the Big Three have strong direct
incentives to acquire information and vote intelligently”).
233
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in the context of institutional investors, means fiduciary duty with
societal ramifications.
C. Potential for Activism
1.

Investors are Making Changes

Following the financial crisis of 2000, there were, and still are,
increased calls for institutional investors to change their investment
policies, exercise oversight, curtail excessive risk, act as “stewards,” and
“engage” with current and prospective investee companies to “achieve
long-term sustainable value.”237 Due to a fear of regulation, institutional
investors responded to these calls for action, and accordingly increased
their activism since the beginning of the 2000s.238 Despite the
challenges associated with stewardship, as discussed further below,
institutional investors are calling their investee companies to strengthen
corporate governance and enhance corporate value.239
We postulate that the responsibility of institutional investors to
exercise oversight over current and prospective investee companies
stems not only from the large volume of assets that they manage for the
general public, but also from their fiduciary nature and the fact that in
the last two decades most of the public’s savings are held in their
hands.240 Note that institutional investors manage the savings and

237 HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 228, at 4-5; Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Stephen
Davis, Institutional Investors: The Next Frontier in Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 7, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/10/07/
institutional-investors-the-next-frontier-in-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/
8GBC-A3AC].
238 See HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 228, at 4-5; Granville Martin, Reporting
Threshold for Institutional Investment Managers, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (Oct. 14, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/14/reportingthreshold-for-institutional-investment-managers/ [https://perma.cc/6GSA-NMNH]. See
generally Mary Ann Cloyd, Shareholder Activism: Who, What, When, and How?, HARV. L.
SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 7, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2015/04/07/shareholder-activism-who-what-when-and-how/ [https://perma.cc/AX8HJLVU] (providing a general overview of activist shareholders including hedge fund
activism).
239 See Romano, supra note 128, at 174.
240 There are several explanations for this as noted above. One of them is that banks,
for example, are not an attractive option for investors, because of the low, even negative
interest rate that they offer. See Macro Risks: Universal Ownership, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INV. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.unpri.org/sdgs/the-sdgs-are-anunavoidable-consideration-for-universal-owners/306.article [https://perma.cc/5V9CUTP3].
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retirement accounts of millions of workers, retirees and other investors,
who trust them and entrust their futures in their hands.241
Can institutional investors promote additional social or
environmental issues other than the financial return on their
investment? This question has been debated for a long time. The
following is a discussion of the fiduciary duties of institutional
investors. We believe that institutional investors’ investment policies
and decisions have a significant impact on corporate governance, firm
performance, and overall behavior in our markets.
a.

Initiatives Taken by Institutional Investors to Favor Gender
Equality and Their Potential

There are many new types of private initiatives. The United Nations,
for example, launched an initiative on promoting social investments
with 2,500 companies from all over the world.242 Although these are
social investments and not explicitly gender equality, social investments
include gender equality, or can be included for better governance.
In October 2016, multinational corporations managing a total of
£10.5 trillion supported an initiative to promote more women in the
management and boards of British companies in which they invest.243
These institutional investors include some of the world’s largest such as
Japan’s Government Pension Fund, JPMorgan Asset Management,
Standard Life, and BlackRock.244 The goal was to reach 30% of women
on the FTSE 350 board of directors by the end of 2020.245 The intention

241

See Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
supra note 118 at 41.
242 Press Release, Secretary General, supra note 175.
243 DELOITTE GLOB. CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, supra note 2; 30% CLUB, 30% CLUB
INVESTOR GROUP: STATEMENT OF INTEREST (2016), https://30percentclub.org/assets/
uploads/UK/Investor_Group/30__Club_Investor_Group_Statement_of_Intent_2016_F
INAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HJD-YKKX] [hereinafter STATEMENT OF INTEREST]; Sarah
Gordon, Big Investors Back Push for 30% Target for Female Executives, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
1,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/4793c798-0742-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
[https://perma.cc/F9QX-9BYN]. See generally Coury et al., supra note 112 (noting the
value of having women in the workplace).
244 Gordon, supra note 243.
245 30% CLUB, STATEMENT OF INTEREST, supra note 243; see also Press Release, 30%
Club, All Male Boards Disappear Across FTSE 350 (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://30percentclub.org/press-releases/view/30-club-exclusive-all-male-boardsdisappear-across-ftse-350 [https://perma.cc/YBG5-8P9D]; Press Release, Dep’t for Bus.,
Energy, & Indust. Strategy & The Rt Hon Alok Sharma MP, Women Make up More
Than a Third of All Board Members Across the FTSE 350 for the First Time (Sept. 22,
2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/women-make-up-more-than-a-third-ofOF FIDUCIARY LAW,
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is to oppose the appointment of directors when companies fail to meet
this target.246 For example, Aviva Investors opposed 82 resolutions
between 2016 and 2018 at a general meeting for gender diversity
considerations on the board of directors and the executive management
of the companies in which it invests.247
In the United States, as noted, institutional investors are actively
promoting gender diversity in the board of directors.248 For example,
the CEO of BlackRock, one of the largest institutional investors in the
world, has warned companies that BlackRock will not invest in them
unless during the next three years they would come up with a
satisfactory plan to promote gender diversity and meet the goals it set
for gender equality.249 State Street Global Advisors, the third largest
institutional investor in the United States, adopted a similar policy.250
In the United Kingdom, The Investment Association, incorporating
£7.7 trillion under asset management, warned 94 traded companies in
2019 that had only one woman director (when 20 of them had no

all-board-members-across-the-ftse-350-for-the-first-time [https://perma.cc/2KTQC4JR].
246 30% CLUB, STATEMENT OF INTEREST, supra note 243.
247 Cheryl Cole, Aviva Investors: Striving to Tackle Racial Inequality in the Investment
Industry, DIVERSITYQ (Feb. 19, 2021), https://diversityq.com/aviva-investors-striving-totackle-racial-inequality-in-the-investment-industry-1511492/ [https://perma.cc/9PBT3YMM]; see also SHAREACTION, VOTING MATTERS 2020: ARE ASSET MANAGERS USING THEIR
PROXY VOTES FOR ACTION ON CLIMATE AND SOCIAL ISSUES? 4 (2020), https://shareaction.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Voting-Matters-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R929-8E37];
Marie-Anne Birken & Gian Piero Cigna, Gender Diversity on Boards: A Cause for
Multilateral Organizations, 1 AIIB YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 16, 25 (2018),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e834/1cda4c1f01e69eddf7f2b47708142703986b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6WL-VZQP]; Economics and Ethics, AVIVIA INVS. (July 21, 2020),
https://www.avivainvestors.com/en-gb/views/aiq-investment-thinking/2020/07/
economics-ethics-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/J628-NP5Q].
248 Kevin Douglas, Tyler Huseman, Eric Knox & Sehrish Siddiqui, A Summary of
Certain Proxy Advisory Firm and Institutional Investor Board Diversity Policies, JDSUPRA
(Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-summary-of-certain-proxyadvisory-8652646/ [https://perma.cc/5PT7-24HS].
249 See BLACKROCK, supra note 10, at 3; Ryan Cole, BlackRock Calls for Greater Gender
Diversity on Director Boards, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Aug. 30, 2019),
https://www.theracetothebottom.org/rttb/2019/8/30/blackrock-calls-for-greater-genderdiversity-on-director-boards [https://perma.cc/2XNV-SH8W].
250 STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS’ GUIDANCE ON
ENHANCING GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS IN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)
COUNTRIES 4 (2020), https://www.ssga.com/content/dam/ssmp/library-content/products/
esg/guidance-on-enhancing-gender-diversity-on-boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/67VUMHZJ].
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woman on the board at all) that unless a plan to change the status quo
is set, it will reconsider its investment in these companies.251
b.

The Current Factors Limiting the Impact of These Initiatives

In recent years, corporations have been pressured by institutional
investors and other market participants to incorporate in their charters
an obligation to act for the benefit of society at large.252 Many companies
and investors have increased an emphasis on ESG as a result; however,
market participants are still struggling with what role gender equality
plays in integration into investment decisions and overall company
frameworks.253 Additionally, while many companies have made
significant progress in disclosure on their environmental impact and
governance standards, the same cannot be said of social impact,
especially with regards to disclosures on the company’s own human
capital management.254
Large market participants, such as asset managers and institutional
investors, are now urging the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
to improve consistency in public company disclosures on how these
businesses are addressing social concerns like gender equality and
diversity in the workforce.255 These market participants, which include
251 Kalyeena Makortoff, Investor Group Warns Almost 100 Firms Over Lack of Gender
Diversity, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2010, 7:01 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.
com/business/2019/may/13/investor-group-warns-almost-100-firms-over-lack-of-genderdiversity [https://perma.cc/KTU8-4HMY]. See generally Maitane Sardon, U.K.
Investment Managers Push for More Diversity on Boards, THE WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-investment-managers-push-for-more-diversity-onboards-11614200970 [https://perma.cc/JTD5-6XXS].
252 See Lynn S. Paine & Suraj Srinivasan, A Guide to the Big Ideas & Debates in
Corporate Governance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 14, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/a-guideto-the-big-ideas-and-debates-in-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/2Z98-BGBY].
253 See UNITED NATIONS, WORLD SURVEY ON THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT, GENDER
EQUALITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 93 (2014), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.
org/content/documents/1900unwomen_surveyreport_advance_16oct.pdf [https://perma.cc/
57UM-4NX9].
254 See Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’, supra note 33, at 159-60; George S.
Georgiev, The Human Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate Law, 95 TULANE
L. REV. 639, 676 (2021); Maj Vaseghi, Pamela Marcogliese & Elizabeth Bieber,
Incorporating Human Capital Management Disclosures into a Company’s Annual Report,
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 31, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2020/10/31/incorporating-human-capital-management-disclosures-into-a-companysannual-report/ [https://perma.cc/6HFS-LGW4].
255 Tom Zanki, SEC Urged to Upgrade Disclosures On COVID-19, Diversity, LAW360
(June 30, 2020, 10:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/compliance/articles/1288058/securged-to-upgrade-disclosures-on-covid-19-diversity [https://perma.cc/2BC9-BSLZ] (“SEC
Chairman Jay Clayton led a virtual roundtable on Tuesday, querying investors and asset
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international organizations256 and global institutional investors,257 are
also engaging with the business community in order to encourage a
responsible response to the pandemic. They publicly urge businesses to
take all stakeholder interests into account when making decisions that
affect employees, communities, and markets.258 For example, Barbara
Novick, co-founder of asset management BlackRock, said that
“investors are also watching how companies are responding to social
unrest that has escalated over the past month following mass
demonstrations protesting racism and police brutality.”259
BlackRock’s call for more disclosures and transparency is not
surprising given the fact that many large institutional investors have
recently been pushing for social agendas, likely in order to improve
their public relations and accord with a new generation of investors —
millennials. Larry Fink, the Chairman and CEO of BlackRock, for
example, repeatedly implored investee companies to appoint at least
two women to serve on the board of directors.260 Fink further stated that
BlackRock will continue to engage with investee companies and warned
managers as to what they would like to see in public companies’ second-quarter
disclosures given fallout from the coronavirus pandemic and related economic
uncertainty.”).
256 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, GLOBAL SOLIDARITY:
RESPONDING TO THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COVID-19 7 (Mar. 2020),
https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/SG-Report-Socio-Economic-Impact-ofCovid19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C5Z-9LP4] (“The United Nations calls on all
businesses and corporations to take three primary actions: (a) Adhere to health, safety
guidelines and provide economic cushions to workers, including through ensuring
worker safety and social distancing and secure wages for those working from home.
(b) Provide financial and technical support to governments by contributing to the
COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund. (c) Repurpose their facilities and business plans
to focus on meeting the needs of this crisis. Some have begun to do so; we need many
more to follow in suit.”).
257 See Investor Statement on Coronavirus Response, which was supported by 336
long-term institutional investors representing over $9.5 trillion USD in assets under
management with global exposure across capital markets. Investor Statement on
Coronavirus Response, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESPONSIBILITY, https://www.iccr.org/
investor-statement-coronavirus-response (last visited July 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
BDF6-D5WQ].
258 See id.
259 Zanki, supra note 255.
260 Sarah Krouse, BlackRock: Companies Should Have at Least Two Female Directors,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2018, 2:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrockcompanies-should-have-at-least-two-female-directors-1517598407 [https://perma.cc/
9VG7-FZG8]; see also Study Finds Women Representation on Boards Affects Gender
Inequality in Firms, MIRAGE NEWS (June 3, 2021, 2:58 PM AEST),
https://www.miragenews.com/study-finds-women-representation-on-boards-570932/
[https://perma.cc/M9QX-5DLF].
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that it will hold them accountable if they fail to make progress “within
a reasonable time frame.”261
The public statements on diversity policy made by Barbara Novick
and Larry Fink have a large impact on investee companies and our
society in general. Their statements could affect every public company
CEO’s decision, especially if he might face a demand to increase gender
diversity. The statements might even have more robust consequences
and motivate the attorneys, auditors, and accountants to ask their CEOs
if gender diversity is correctly reflected in the public company’s SEC
filings. That being said, it must be noted that even BlackRock itself is
not the best example for gender equality — there are only five women
on BlackRock’s board of directors, out of a total number of sixteen
directors.262 So, even in BlackRock’s own example, women only account
for 27% of the total board members, not 50%.
If we look at the other large institutional players — Vanguard and
State Street Global Advisors, for example — we will find that they are
not the best illustrations of gender equality either. Gender diversity data
is generally measurable. There are only three women on Vanguard’s
board of directors, out of a total number of ten directors.263 There are
only four women on State Street Global Advisors’ board, out of a total
number of eleven directors,264 representing 36% women on the board.
While they do not reach 50% women on board, or even close, they are
still above the market average.
The Big Three are not the only institutional players who recently
decided to elevate the issue of board diversity on their agenda. As noted
above, a few years ago, in Davos, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”) decided
to share its new initiatives with the world and was also able to attract
the media’s attention. David Solomon, Goldman’s CEO, announced that

261 Anthony Goodman & Rusty O’Kelley, Institutional Investors Lead Push for GenderDiverse Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/26/institutional-investors-lead-push-for-genderdiverse-boards/ [https://perma.cc/3VPP-DDX7].
262 Board Diversity at BlackRock, BLACKROCK, https://ir.blackrock.com/governance/
board-of-directors/Board-Diversity-at-BlackRock/#:~:text=The%20Board%20includes
%20five%20women,non%2DU.S.%20or%20dual%20citizens (last visited July 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/CQ68-M2CP].
263 See Our Leaders, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/ourleaders/ (last visited July 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/P8PX-25HT].
264 See Board of Directors, STATE ST., https://investors.statestreet.com/corporategovernance/board-of-directors/default.aspx (last visited July 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
QUC4-QLW2].
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“we’re not going to take a company public unless there’s at least one
diverse board candidate, with a focus on women.”265
While this announcement has implications for any new company that
wants to go public with the firm, Goldman, like BlackRock, does not
have full equality on its board. Only four of its board members are
women, out of the total number of eleven directors.266 Women account
for only 36% of Goldman’s board members, not 50%.
Perhaps these initiatives are part of a larger global “paradigm shift” in
thinking about corporate governance, human capital and culture, and
the role that these factors play in attracting, engaging and retaining
talent.267 Various groups of very influential stakeholders, including the
Global Reporting Initiative, the Embankment Project for Inclusive
Capitalism, the Business Roundtable, the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (“SASB”), and the SEC are pursuing projects that are
intended to identify or create new metrics to measure and demonstrate
long-term value to financial markets.268
These groups have publicly identified human capital and culture as
important parts of a company’s intangible assets, which “are now
estimated to comprise on average 52% of a company’s market value,”
according to Ernst & Young.269 These groups are pushing management
to modernize corporate decision-making and strategize to foster
innovation and create long-term value.270 These efforts are welcomed,
but there are many challenges with how they are implemented and the
outcomes that they produce.

265

Mehnert, supra note 32; see also Son, supra note 32.
See Board of Directors, GOLDMAN SACHS, https://www.goldmansachs.com/aboutus/people-and-leadership/leadership/board-of-directors/ (last visited July 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/E2KY-W432].
267 See Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’, supra note 33, at 120.
268 Klemash et al., supra note 224.
269 ERNST & YOUNG, HOW AND WHY HUMAN CAPITAL DISCLOSURES ARE EVOLVING 1,
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/cbm/ey-how-andwhy-human-capital-disclosures-are-evolving.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GFB-JBBG].
See Embankment Project for Inclusive Capitalism (EPIC), a project intended “to identify
and create new metrics to measure and demonstrate long-term value to financial
markets” by the Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism and Ernst & Young, participated in
by more than 30 asset owners (such as Allstate, CalPERS and MetLife), asset managers
(like Vanguard, State Street and Fidelity) and companies (three of which are in the Top
100 Companies). COAL. FOR INCLUSIVE CAPITALISM, EMBANKMENT PROJECT FOR INCLUSIVE
CAPITALISM 4 (2018), https://www.coalitionforinclusivecapitalism.com/wp-content/
uploads/2021/01/coalition-epic-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V39K-DZZA].
270 See generally ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 269 (providing a broad overview of the
traditional fiduciary duty analysis).
266
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Although these initiatives have had some impact, it can be seen from
the final outcome that it is very slow and relies on the goodwill of the
directors or CEOs of institutional investors, which can choose other
agendas in the future. The following are our proposals for a different
solution based on the existing laws and regulations.
Today, we believe that the tide is turning among scholars, executives,
and policymakers on the fact that companies must act as good citizens
in the community, and, moreover, to contribute to society. Large
corporations make large amounts of profits from the public — is it
inconceivable to ask them to be accountable to the public? What about
institutional investors that hold large amounts of the public’s funds?
2.

The Impact of the Purpose of the Corporate Entity on the
Directors’ Fiduciary Duty

There is an ongoing debate among scholars of the traditional view of
fiduciary duty,271 who claim that management is responsible for
protecting the interests of the shareholders,272 and scholars of the
stakeholder approach, who claim that management is responsible for
protecting the interest of all stakeholders.273 The stakeholder approach
is a “strategic management process” and not merely a strategic planning
process.274 The strategic management process allows management to
actively design a new direction for the firm, which will take into account
271 See generally Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38
B.C. L. REV. 595, 600 (1997) (discussing the traditional fiduciary duty analysis).
272 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 18-19
(1984) (Williamson [1984] used a transaction cost framework to show that
shareholders deserved special consideration over other stakeholders because of “asset
specificity.” He argued that a shareholder’s stake was uniquely tied to the success of the
firm and would have no residual value should the firm fail, unlike, for example, the
labor of a worker).
273 See R. Edward Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic
Management 97-98 (Darden Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Working Paper No. 01-02,
2001) (“Freeman and Evan [1990] have argued, to the contrary, that Williamson’s
approach to corporate governance can indeed be used to explain all stakeholders’
relationships. Many other stakeholders have stakes that are, to a degree, firm specific.
Furthermore, shareholders have a more liquid market (the stock market) for exit than
most other stakeholders. Thus, asset specificity alone does not grant a prime
responsibility towards stockholders at the expense of all others.”); see also William M.
Evan & Edward R. Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian
Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 97, 98 (Tom Beauchamp & Norman E.
Bowie eds., Prentice Hall 5th ed. 1996).
274 Freeman & McVea, supra note 273, at 11 (“Strategic planning focuses on trying
to predict the future environment and then independently developing plans for the firm
to exploit its position.”).
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how the firm can have an effect on the environment and on society, in
addition to how the environment and society possibly will affect the
firm.275
Until recently, institutional investors were initially reluctant to
embrace this concept, arguing that their fiduciary duty was limited to
the maximization of shareholder values irrespective of environmental
or social impacts, or broader governance issues such as corruption.276
But as evidence has grown that ESG issues have financial implications,
the tide has shifted. In many important markets, including the United
States and the European Union, ESG integration is increasingly seen as
part of their fiduciary duty.277
The question remains on how corporations should accomplish these
goals, and what the main purpose for their existence should be. We
argue that institutional investors ought to balance the boundaries of
their fiduciary duties with regards to how to invest the funds that they
control. They have the power and discretion in determining how to
invest and manage funds. It is likely that they will not be violating their
fiduciary duty by taking gender equality factors (any non-economic
policy that promotes economic benefits for the long run) into account.
As explained in further detail above, an investment decision is a
business decision and as such is likely protected under the business
judgment rule.
CONCLUSION
Fiduciary duties reflect the central role of leaders in corporate
governance. Those with the most responsibility benefit the most from
corporate success, but also bear commensurate fiduciary
responsibilities. Diversifying for gender inclusion may seem an odd fit
among other fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties are where governance
imposes the burden of “doing the right thing.” Fiduciary duties involve
normatively good behavior that proves essential to ensuring responsible
decision-making and achieving positive outcomes for firms.
Gender equality fits squarely in this normative framework. Sex
equality and diversity in leadership, it is now widely agreed, helps
275

Id.
Sebastian Sharpe, The Rise of ESG, INVENTURE (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://inventurerecruitment.com/news/2019/3/8/the-rise-of-esg [https://perma.cc/KPV69QXD].
277 Id.; Brian Tomlinson, ESG and Fiduciary Duties: A Roadmap for the US Capital
Market, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2016/11/01/esg-and-fiduciary-duties-a-roadmap-for-the-us-capital-market/
[https://perma.cc/49RV-M4U4].
276
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ensure effective and good governance.278 It prevents “groupthink,” the
reliance on a solitary group as the sole arbiters.279 In this sense, gender
equality may reduce the risk of bad governance or even a crisis. For this
reason, diversification figures among the fiduciary duties that
institutional investors hold.
Furthermore, institutional investors also bear this responsibility
because of their unique and dominant role within the firm. While
mandatory state quotas may realize quick gains related to gender
equality, institutional investors have a unique understanding of the
firms they invest in, which empowers them to diversify effectively.
Relatively static fiduciary duties have guided institutional investors
for many decades, and for that reason, we anticipate this proposal will
evoke some controversy. The novelty of placing equality among the
hidebound area of fiduciary duties alone will ruffle feathers. A more
holistic understanding of good governance reveals that gender equality
and diversity constitute a universally agreed-upon imperative for firm
governance.
A fiduciary duty of diversification with regard to gender may open up
other conversations about the benefits of using private ordering to
advance inclusion.
Not only does it seem appropriate to ask institutional investors to
carry this fiduciary duty, but imposing this duty on them may prove far
more effective than other efforts. As a new generation of leaders rise to
lead, the resulting changes may prove revolutionary, both for firms and
investors.

278 Nicholas J. Price, The Importance of Diversity for Good Governance, DILIGENT
INSIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2018), https://insights.diligent.com/corporate-governance/theimportance-of-diversity-for-good-governance/ [https://perma.cc/HZT4-EF8R]; see
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